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Article
Picking Friends From the Crowd: Amicus
Participation as Political Symbolism
OMARI SCOTT SIMMONS
The modern process of amicus curiae participation is a form of political
symbolism reflecting the Supreme Court’s irreconcilable role in American
democracy as a quasi-representative policy-making institution. Specifically,
this political symbolism reassures the public, particularly vulnerable groups,
of the Court’s democratic character. Amicus participation dispels external
public criticism that the Court is detached and indifferent to the public,
without significantly undermining the Court’s independence. Ultimately, the
Court’s institutional legitimacy rests upon the dual pillars of independence
and inclusion. Amicus participation contributes significantly to the latter.
Critics of the Court’s current open door policy to amicus participation fear
that the lack of additional constraints governing the submission of amicus
briefs encourages partisan excess, promotes judicial activism, and unduly
burdens the Court. However, the benefits to the Court and its multiple
stakeholders outweigh these concerns. This Article builds upon the existing
legal literature by (i) exploring amicus participation’s value to multiple
stakeholders, not simply the Court and (ii) highlighting the important link
between amicus participation, political symbolism, and the Court’s
institutional legitimacy.
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Picking Friends From the Crowd: Amicus
Participation as Political Symbolism
OMARI SCOTT SIMMONS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In other words, all the Court has done today, to borrow from another
context, is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out its friends.1
The separation of governmental powers and a system of checks and
balances to counter autocratic abuses within any branch of government are
at the heart of democratic tradition in the United States. In theory, the
Supreme Court is expected to provide stability in the administration of
justice ensuring some degree of both horizontal and vertical equity for the
polity.2 For many groups and entities, the courts are the best, if not the
only, government branch capable of guaranteeing substantive and
procedural justice to all.3 For vulnerable groups, the court system, at least
from a symbolic perspective, is the “great leveler.”4
Unlike other branches of government, ascendancy to the Supreme
* Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. B.A., 1996, Wake Forest
University; J.D., 1999, University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., 2001, University of Cambridge, Pembroke
College. I am grateful to Kami Chavis Simmons, Ronald Wright, John Korzen, and Shannon Gilreath
for reviewing drafts of this Article and offering their insightful comments. Any errors herein are my
own. I also wish to thank Sally Irvin, Gregory Kupka, Amy Willis, Meredith Pinson, Emile Thompson,
and Azaria Tesfa for their valuable research assistance; and Wake Forest University School of Law for
its generous support.
1
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2005) (Scalia J., dissenting).
2
Horizontal equity is the equal treatment of equals. An example of this principle is seen in the
equal protection context, which demands that similarly situated persons receive like treatment. See
generally, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Vertical equity, on the other hand, is disparate treatment on
account of legitimate differences. An example of vertical equity would be the heightened scrutiny
afforded to racial and gender classifications in the equal protection context. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (“Our decisions . . . establish that the party seeking to
uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing
an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the classification.”).
3
See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 8 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (asserting
that systems of representation are most inclusive when they encourage the “perspectives of relatively
marginalized or disadvantaged social groups to receive specific expression”). Throughout this nation’s
history, the Supreme Court has played a critical role in securing justice for groups that held little
legislative weight or where political realities constrained the other branches of government from acting.
A vivid example is the Warren Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4
HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 218 (1960). For almost a decade, cases involving the
2000 presidential election, affirmative action, capital punishment, sodomy laws as well as potential
Court vacancies have all kept the Supreme Court thoroughly immersed in political discourse. See, e.g.,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 566 (2003);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311, 313–14, 316 (2003); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100–01
(2000).
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Court is not conditioned upon electoral politics or constituency demands.
The lifetime appointment of Justices, in theory, frees them from being
accountable to any particular ruling regime or constituency.5 Thus,
pluralistic and partisan politics should play a limited role in judicial
decision making. But, just how different is the Court from the legislative
and the executive branches where organized interest groups mobilize to
Undoubtedly, certain institutional
sway government outcomes?6
similarities exist.
The Supreme Court’s role in American democracy manifests a tension
between the Court’s duty to adjudicate disputes between two parties,
resolving the specific conflict before it, and its role to create law, settling
disputes between circuits and answering novel legal questions. By
definition, every question the Supreme Court answers is either of
constitutional significance, unanswered, or a source of confusion or
disagreement between courts.7 A decision that says “party X prevails over
party Y” simultaneously establishes victories and losses for others and
implicitly affirms, provides further guidance, or overrules court decisions
5
See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the importance of permanent
and independent judges in achieving and preserving justice).
6
The debate surrounding the question of whether and/or how much politics affects judicial
decision making is not new. Proponents of legal formalism argue that the Supreme Court is not
inherently political or subject to interest group pressures that plague the other branches of government.
Instead, they envision an objective judiciary that is constrained by legal doctrine. Legal realists, on the
other hand, assert that ideology and contextual factors are a driving force behind judicial decision
making, not simply doctrine. See Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: ‘Things
Ain’t What They Used to Be’, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 370 (2005) (providing a history of legal realism).
Also, legal realists are most likely to contend that decision making is more about judicial activism as
opposed to judicial restraint. Notwithstanding, judges, irrespective of political party affiliation,
ardently refute the assertion that political ideology trumps adherence to doctrine. See Emerson H.
Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215,
229–30 (1999) (providing an empirical study of the effect of political ideology on judicial decision
making). Tiller and Cross acknowledge a partisan component of judging at the federal circuit court
level but also recognize that doctrine matters as well. Tiller and Cross are more concerned with
eliminating the partisan component of judicial decision making. Accordingly, they identify particular
instances where doctrine is most likely to matter and then propose that circuit panels be divided along
party lines rather than being randomly selected. Tiller and Cross reason that the presence of a minority
“whistleblower” has a disciplining effect on ideological decision making. Tiller and Cross’s assertions
have been challenged and, in some instances, mischaracterized by esteemed members of the U.S. Court
of Appeals. See Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 235 (1999)
(“Although judges, as human beings, cannot help but be influenced by their life experiences, it is not
fair to say that political philosophy is the invisible hand guiding all or even most appellate
decisionmaking.”). For example, Harry T. Edwards former Chief Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, inaccurately dubbed Tiller and Cross’s arguments as such: “Where the authors
might have one believe that judging is entirely political, I maintain, and always have maintained, that
appellate judging is fundamentally a principled practice.” Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision
Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1337–38 (1998). Tiller and Cross, however, are not
suggesting that judicial decision making is “entirely” political or unprincipled. This reluctance to
acknowledge the potential of partisan influence on the part of the judiciary is perhaps because any
admission that judicial decision making is partisan implies that the decision making process is
impugned by bias.
7
See SUP. CT. R. 10 (providing considerations governing review of certiorari); see also U.S.
CONST. art. III (vesting the Supreme Court with judiciary authority).
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on other cases. The Supreme Court cannot escape the reach of its
decisions. It functions as a proxy for the entire judicial system. Although
Supreme Court Justices are not elected like members of Congress, they
nonetheless engage in law making. This institutional fact has led
commentators to assert that the Supreme Court’s legitimacy is inseparable
from other governmental institutions in our society.8 Therefore, it is not
surprising that the Court seeks and accepts input from many sources—
particularly in the form of amicus briefs.9
Justices cannot simply rely on the immediate case and the skill (or lack
thereof) of the immediate parties.
Decisions are published
pronouncements that must reflect good law and policy.10 The Court
operates within a broader context of a “constitutional culture” that involves
an ongoing conversation with non-judicial actors.11 The modern process of
8
See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rising Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 153, 154 (1986)
(“[T]he legitimacy of courts is inseparable from the legitimacy of other institutions of our society.”).
9
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (8th ed. 2004) (“Amicus Curiae. . . . [Latin ‘friend of the
court’] A person who is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the court
to file a brief in the action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter.”).
10
Alexis de Tocqueville recognized this unique dilemma:
The peace, the prosperity, and the very existence of the Union are vested in the
hands of seven judges. Without their active co-operation the Constitution would be
a dead letter: the Executive appeals to them for assistance against the encroachments
of the legislative powers; the Legislature demands their protections from the designs
of the Executive; they defend the Union from the disobedience of the States; the
States from the exaggerated claims of the Union, the public interest against the
interests of private citizens, and the conservative spirit of order against the fleeting
innovations of democracy. Their power is enormous, but it is clothed in the
authority of public opinion. They are the all-powerful guardians of a people which
respects law, but they would be impotent against popular neglect or popular
contempt. The force of public opinion is the most intractable of agents, because its
exact limits cannot be defined; and it is not less dangerous to exceed than to remain
below the boundary prescribed.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 150 (Henry Reeve trans., Colonial Press 1900)
(emphasis added); see also Linda Greenhouse, What Got into the Court? What Happens Next?, 57 ME.
L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (“But no great Supreme Court case is only a question of law.”). De Tocqueville
also believed that:
Federal judges must not only be good citizens, and men possessed of that
information and integrity which are indispensable to magistrates, but they must be
statesmen—politicians, not unread in the signs of the times, not afraid to brave the
obstacles which can be subdued nor slow to turn aside such encroaching elements as
may threaten the supremacy of the Union and the obedience which is due to the
laws.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra, at 150.
11
See Robert C. Post, Foreword, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (2003) (noting that “constitutional law emerges from an ongoing
dialectic between constitutional culture and the institutional practices of constitutional adjudication”).
Public perception and the legitimacy of the court are valid concerns as the following comments
illustrate:
Indeed, the courts cannot do their job of fair and just adjudication of disputes
without the trust and faith of the community, the bar, and even their own employees.
The courts depend on the cooperation and participation of people from all three
communities. If significant parts of those communities mistrust the impartiality of
the courts, they will not provide the cooperation, participation, and support the
system needs to function properly.
It is not enough for the courts to be just; they must also be perceived to be just.
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amicus curiae participation is a form of political symbolism reflecting the
Court’s irreconcilable role in American democracy as a quasirepresentative policy making institution.
Specifically, the political
symbolism of amicus curiae participation reassures the public, particularly
vulnerable groups, of the Court’s democratic character.
Amicus
participation dispels external public criticism that the Court is detached and
indifferent to the public, without significantly undermining the Court’s
independence. Ultimately, the Court’s institutional legitimacy rests upon
the dual pillars of independence and inclusion. Amicus participation
contributes significantly to the latter.
Critics of the Court’s current open door policy to amicus participation
fear that the lack of additional constraints governing the submission of
amicus briefs encourages partisan excess, promotes judicial activism, and
unduly burdens the Supreme Court.12 However, the benefits to the Court
and its multiple stakeholders outweigh these concerns.
Amicus
participation has received significant scholarly treatment in the legal and
political science literature. Most of this literature either attempts to
Otherwise, the courts lose legitimacy as dispute resolvers and instead may be
perceived as irrelevant or, worse, as instruments of oppression. The courts must,
therefore, do more than simply avoid legally actionable bias. They must make
certain that members of the three communities believe both that the courts are fair
and that they will be treated equally when they enter the courthouse.
Todd D. Peterson, Studying the Impact of Race and Ethnicity in the Federal Courts, 64 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 173, 176 (1996).
12
This risk is underscored by evidence and arguments presented in amicus briefs that have not
been challenged through the litigation process and are not subject to the same evidentiary safeguards as
the parties’ briefs. In Akins v. Federal Election Commission, the D.C. Circuit expressed its disapproval
of a Supreme Court action that relied on an argument presented by an amici and not the immediate
parties:
I recognize that the Supreme Court has moved pretty far from traditional notions of
judicial restraint that confine courts to issues presented by the parties . . . but I think
this decision represents another large step in that regrettable process insofar as it was
an amicus—an amicus who had not appeared until the case reached the Supreme
Court—who made the dispositive argument, one which was never once made before
us.
Akins v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 146 F.3d 1049, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Jaffee v. Redmond,
518 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that no organizations seek the truth besides the
Court); Philip B. Kurland & Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Business of the Supreme Court O.T. 1982, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 628, 647 (1983) (asserting amicus briefs are “a waste of time, effort, and money in a
useless function”). Judge Richard Posner cites three limited instances in which amicus submissions
should be permissible: (i) where “a party is not represented competently or is not represented at all”;
(ii) where “the amicus has an interest in some other case that may be affected by the decision in the
present case”; and (iii) where “the amicus has unique information or perspective that can help the court
beyond the help that the lawyers of the parties can provide.” Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997).
Most critics of amicus participation equate the value of amicus participation solely with the
informational value it offers to Justices rendering decisions. These commentators, however, should
consider adopting a more expansive approach to valuing amicus participation that takes into account
multiple constituencies and embraces a broader understanding of the impact of symbolic reassurance on
the Court’s legitimacy. See Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 315, 357 (2008) (“Increased amicus participation will have a democratizing influence on the
litigation process . . . .” Moreover, “it is often more cost effective for social movements to make their
voices heard as amicus parties than as parties bringing litigation.”).
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anecdotally illustrate the impact of amicus briefs or empirically validate
the impact of amicus briefs on judicial decision making.13 This Article
builds upon this valuable literature by (i) exploring amicus participation’s
value to multiple stakeholders, not simply the Court and (ii) highlighting
the important link between amicus participation, political symbolism, and
the Court’s legitimacy.
Part II of this Article provides historical background on amicus curiae
participation before the Supreme Court and identifies factors that have
contributed to its extensive use and transformation into a symbolic
mechanism reflecting democratic inclusion.
Part III asserts modern amicus participation is a form of political
symbolism that reassures the public―particularly vulnerable groups―of
the Supreme Court’s democratic character. This is especially true in cases
having broad social impact and political salience, such as cases involving
capital punishment, affirmative action, free speech, and assisted suicide. In
this context, amicus participation provides a link between the Supreme
Court and the polity, reinforcing the Court’s institutional legitimacy.
Amicus participation illustrates that inclusion, like independence, is a key
pillar upon which the Court’s institutional legitimacy rests.
Part IV provides an expansive view of the value of modern amicus
participation to various stakeholders—the immediate parties, the Court,
and the amici. The current legal literature does not incorporate the value
amicus participation provides to the Court’s various constituencies, namely
the parties and the amici. Limiting the value analysis to the Court
exclusively, while excluding other constituencies, understates the value of
modern amicus participation.
Part V examines, at an aggregate level, the different entities that
participate as amici before the Supreme Court. These diverse group
dynamics reflect the Court’s important societal function as a quasirepresentative body and how the Court’s inclusionary function reinforces
13
See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who
Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782, 784 (Aug. 1990); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas
W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743
(2000); Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694
(1963); Kelly Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Briefs, 20 J.L. &
POL. 33, 49 (2004) (analyzing the effectiveness of amicus briefs from the perspective of Supreme Court
clerks); Ryan J. Owens & Lee Epstein, Amici Curiae During the Rehnquist Years, 89 JUDICATURE 127,
129–32 (Nov.–Dec. 2005). For example, Kearney and Merrill interpret their empirical evidence
concerning amicus briefs as an indication of the validity of certain judicial decision making models,
i.e., the legal model, attitudinal model, and interest group theory of the judicial process. See id.
Ultimately, they suggest that there is more empirical support for the legal model, than for the other
decision making models. See id. Kearney and Merrill admittedly rely on three overly-simplistic
models for judicial decision making, which as defined, do not contemplate that judicial decision
making may employ a hybridized approach requiring a mixture of the models; or that certain types of
cases (e.g., capital punishment, reproductive rights, voting rights, and affirmative action) and other
contextual factors will determine the level of influence a particular decision making model may indeed
have on swaying outcomes. Minus actual citation of amicus briefs such validation is difficult due to
the number of intervening variables.
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its institutional legitimacy.
Part VI analyzes the Supreme Court’s decisions in Washington v.
Glucksberg and Roper v. Simmons, which exemplify the types of
politically salient cases where the Court symbolizes a quasi-representative
body.14 These examples provide a vivid illustration of the dynamics of
amicus participation, the diverse interests involved, the types of
argumentation employed, and the discursive exchange of perspectives. In
this section, a deeper content-based analysis of the amicus briefs further
reveals how the Court engages non-judicial actors in an ongoing dialogue.
Ultimately, this Article contends that modern amicus participation is a
valuable symbolic mechanism reflecting democratic inclusion that, inter
alia, provides a dotted line between the Court and the polity. This link
reinforces the Court’s institutional legitimacy. Consequently, efforts to
restrict amici before the Court rather than encourage greater participation
via the present “open door” policy should be approached with caution.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMICUS PARTICIPATION
A. Historical Beginnings
The submission of amicus briefs dates back as far as ancient Rome.15
Under the English common law system, amici provided the courts with
impartial legal information beyond the court’s expertise or immediate
knowledge.16 Whereas the name amicus curiae or “friend of the court”
described the function of amici at common law, today, some argue that the
more apt description of amicus participation before the Supreme Court is
“friend of a party.”17 Today, the amicus brief “as a form of information
gathering may provide the judicial counterpart of lobbying and
congressional hearings in the legislative process.”18 Amicus participation
is just one of several mechanisms used by interest groups to influence
government decision making.19
14

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see
also infra Part VI.
15
See Krislov, supra note 13, at 694.
16
See Madeleine Schachter, The Utility of Pro Bono Representation of U.S.-Based Amicus Curiae
in Non-U.S. and Multi-National Courts as a Means of Advancing the Public Interest, 28 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 88, 90 (2004) (“[T]he amicus submission originally was intended to provide a court with
important legal information that was beyond its notice or expertise . . . .”); Krislov, supra note 13, at
694–95.
17
Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063 (explaining that the “term ‘amicus curiae’ means friend of the court not
friend of a party”); see also Michael J. Harris, Amicus Curiae: Friend or Foe? The Limits of
Friendship in American Jurisprudence, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 6 (2000).
18
Krislov, supra note 13, at 717.
19
See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S.
Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1123 (1988) [hereinafter Caldeira & Wright, Organized
Interests]. Whereas interest group lobbying appears most prominently at the legislative level, interest
groups actively lobby to alter the composition of the Supreme Court via the judicial appointments
process and participate as amici.
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Historically, the increased use of amicus briefs mirrored a “change in
tactics and structure of interest articulation in American politics as a whole
that occurred during the latter quarter of the nineteenth century.”20 This
period saw interest group activity transform “from personal, face-to-face
contacts (including corruption) to impersonal, organized, and systematic,
bureaucratically undertaken and oriented activity.”21 The advantages
accruing to “bureaucratically sophisticated groups in other political arenas”
became evident in the judicial context as well.22 These interest groups
were characterized by their ability to mobilize resources, their use of
expertise, their flexibility to respond quickly before policy was set, and
their sensitivity to raising new issues.23 Other influences on the use of
amicus briefs included the growth of administrative agencies, the growth
of the welfare state, and the government’s increased intervention in broad
social problems such as school desegregation, racial covenants, and
redistricting legislation.24 During the initial decades of the twentieth
century, amici filed briefs in only 10% of cases before the Supreme
Court.25 From 1986 through 1995, amici filed briefs in 85% of the Court’s
argued cases.26 Between 1945 and 1995, the number of amicus brief
filings increased by more than 800%, while the numbers of cases decided
on the merits did not increase.27 Between 1996 and 2003, at least one
amicus brief was filed in 95% of cases.28
Some of the first private interest groups to effectively use the
opportunity for broader access that amicus briefs provided included labor
unions, “racial minority groups, securities and insurance interests, railroad
interests, and miscellaneous groups under severe attack, notably the liquor
interests in the first quarter of th[e] twentieth century.”29 These groups
perhaps selected this new channel of “self-protection or aggrandizement”
due to “[s]heer familiarity with the intricacies of the existing system,
strong dissatisfaction with it, and relative desperation.”30 Yet, widespread
use by civil rights organizations such as the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”) and the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (“NAACP”) drew public attention to the issue of amicus
20

Krislov, supra note 13, at 704.
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 704–05.
24
Id. at 706.
25
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 744.
26
See id. at 744, 753.
27
See id. at 749. Actual citations and quotations of amici in Court opinions may suggest some
degree of growing impact or value to the Court. Supreme Court citation and quotation of amicus briefs
have undoubtedly increased over the past fifty years. Id. at 757–58. Thirty-seven percent of cases
between 1986–95 cited amici. Over the same period, amici were quoted at a rate of fifteen percent,
which was double the amount for the previous three decades. Id. at 757–59.
28
Owens & Epstein, supra note 13, at 129 fig. 1.
29
Id.; see also Krislov, supra note 13, at 707.
30
Id.
21
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31

participation.
The NAACP (particularly the Legal Defense Fund
(“LDF”)), almost since its inception, has participated as amicus curiae in
Supreme Court litigation.32 The NAACP “[i]n the face of failures to gain
concessions from Congress, due in large part to the power wielded by the
Southern Delegation, particularly in the Senate,” turned to the judiciary
where they experienced significant success.33 NAACP victories altered the
doctrinal development of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and
elevated the legal status of African Americans.34 Whether expanding the
rights of blacks to vote,35 preventing the systemic exclusion of blacks from
juries,36 or desegregating public schools,37 litigation became the primary
mechanism for championing minority rights that were difficult to obtain in
other political venues. Not surprisingly, increased amicus participation
ensued.
The coordination among primary litigants and amici was an essential
aspect of the NAACP’s litigation strategy.38 The Restrictive Covenant
Cases of 1948 are a classic example of amicus participation reflecting the
norm of democratic inclusion.39 In those cases, amicus briefs on behalf of
American Indian groups, Japanese American groups, Jewish American
groups, religious organizations, labor organizations, and others supported
the black litigants, who were represented by the NAACP LDF lawyers.40
The extensive use of amicus briefs and extralegal facts in Supreme
Court jurisprudence can be attributed, in part, to a shift from exclusive
31
See id. at 709 (“[I]t was the use of [amicus briefs] by civil rights organizations which drew
widespread public attention.”); see also Clement E. Vose, NAACP Strategy in the Covenant Cases, 6
W. RES. L. REV. 101, 104–05 (1955) (analyzing NAACP strategy in the Restrictive Covenant Cases of
1948). The ACLU filed briefs in sixteen percent of all cases from 1986 to 1995. Kearney & Merrill,
supra note 13, at 753 n.25. During the same period, the American Federation of Labor-Congress of
Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”) also appeared frequently before the Court in over six percent of
the cases. Id.
32
Krislov, supra note 13, at 707; see also Vose, supra note 31, at 102 (“From 1915 to January,
1948, when the Restrictive Covenant Cases were argued, 23 of 25 sponsored cases were won by the
Association.”). “Since 1939 the NAACP has, strictly speaking, devoted itself to legislative activities
while, a separate organization, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., has had the
exclusive task of conducting legal action.” Id. at 103.
33
Id. at 102.
34
Id.
35
See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 539–41 (1927); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347,
353–54, 361 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 277 (1939).
36
See Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394, 395
(1935).
37
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
38
See Vose, supra note 31, at 134 (discussing the NAACP’s strategy of limiting the number of
briefs filed in a particular case so as not to flood the Court with too many redundant arguments).
39
See id. at 141–43 (discussing participation in the Restrictive Covenants Cases by cultural
associations, labor groups, religious organizations, and liberal groups).
40
Id. at 133–34. In the famous Grandfather Clause case, Guinn v. United States, the NAACP
participated as amici and justified its participation on the following grounds: “[T]he vital importance
of these questions to every citizen of the United States, whether white or colored, seems amply to
warrant submission of this brief.” See Brief for NAACP as Amicus Curiae at 2, Guinn v. United
States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (No. 96). The brief is in the microfiche containing Supreme Court cases
and briefs.
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reliance on the dominant paradigm of legal formalism during the
nineteenth century to a greater influence of legal realism during the first
half of the twentieth century.41 Legal realists rejected formalism and tried
to convey how law operated in social, political, and economic contexts.42
As the Court became more accepting of extra-legal facts and social science
evidence, progressive groups began to use amicus briefs to lobby the Court
in politically charged cases such as those involving social legislation and
desegregation.43 The Warren Court in Brown was one of the first courts to
use social science data extensively. In the wake of Brown, the submission
of extra-legal evidence via amicus participation increased.44
B. Modern Amicus Participation
Former Justice Felix Frankfurter argued for the restrictive use of
amicus participation within the confines of the adversary system.45
Frankfurter did not want to see the Court exploited or used as soapbox for
interest group activity.46 This narrow view of amicus participation and the
adversarial system would support limiting the number of amici.
Alternatively, Justice Hugo Black supported broadening amicus
participation to a wide array of groups.47 Black’s broader vision of the
adversarial system allowed for extensive participation by amici—
acknowledging that cases before the Court affected many people beyond
the immediate parties.48 Under Black’s approach, the Court acts in a quasirepresentative capacity. Today, Supreme Court rules (or more accurately
the lax enforcement of those rules) reflect Black’s vision of amicus
participation.
Presently, the Supreme Court allows for virtually unlimited amicus
participation.49 Amicus participation may take place at two stages in the
41

See Macaulay, supra note 6, at 366–403 (describing this evolution in detail).
See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective
Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 100–03 (1993) (describing the importance of social
context to legal realism); Hazard, supra note 8, at 171–72 (“[W]hether moderate or radical, realism
theorized that a decision was not compelled by precedent, but expressed a choice on the part of the
judges who made the decision.”).
43
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 108–10. The Committee of Law Teachers Against
Segregation in Legal Education filed a brief urging the Court to desegregate the nation’s schools in
Sweatt v. Painter. Brief for the Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (No. 44), 1950 WL
78683; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 110 n.85.
44
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 297 (1955) (listing seven amicus briefs).
45
See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 784; Krislov, supra note 13, at 717.
46
Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 784.
47
See Krislov, supra note 13, at 717 (“[T]o the extent that Mr. Justice Black resists such
restraints, he is supporting a broadening of the interests likely to come before the Court and the issues
presented to it for resolution.”).
48
See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 784–85 (quoting Justice Black: “‘I think the public
interest and judicial administration would be better served by relaxing rather than tightening the rule
against amicus curiae briefs.’”).
49
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 761–65 (discussing the history of the liberal filing
42
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Supreme Court litigation process—the agenda setting stage (i.e., decisions
on petitions for writs of certiorari and jurisdictional statements) and at the
merits stage.50 Supreme Court rules require organizations and individuals
that wish to participate as amici to obtain permission from both parties
involved in the litigation.51 If either party refuses, the individual or entity
wishing to participate must file a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae
brief to the Supreme Court.52 On the other hand, governmental entities
such as the Solicitor General and individual states do not need the
permission of either party.53 Although the Court has power to limit amicus
participation by denying motions for leave to file, it seldom exercises this
discretionary power despite an already heavy workload.54 Supreme Court
Rule 37.1 articulates the purpose and desired contents of an amicus brief:
“An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant
matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of
considerable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve
this purpose burdens Court, and its filing is not favored.”55 Supreme Court
rules expressly recognize both the utility and the excess of amicus briefs.56
Some commentators argue that too much amicus participation and overreliance on such briefs may unfairly disadvantage the immediate parties to
the litigation.57 Despite these concerns, “[t]he Supreme Court’s continued
willingness to receive this rising tide of briefs from not-so-disinterested
requirements and the open door approach to amici).
50
SUP. CT. R. 37.2–37.3; see also Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 784 (“These rules apply to
amicus briefs on petitions for [certiorari] and jurisdictional statements as well as to briefs on decisions
on the merits.”).
51
See SUP. CT. R. 37.2(a), 37.3(a).
52
See SUP. CT. R. 37.2(b), 37.3(b).
53
Supreme Court Rule 37.4 provides that:
No motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief is necessary if the brief is
presented on behalf of the United States by the Solicitor General; on behalf of any
agency of the United States allowed by law to appear before this Court when
submitted by the agency’s authorized legal representative; on behalf of a State,
Commonwealth, Territory, or Possession when submitted by its Attorney General;
or on behalf of a city, county, town, or similar entity when submitted by its
authorized law officer.
SUP. CT. R. 37.4. Moreover, Supreme Court Rule 37.6 requires amici other than governmental entities
to:
[I]ndicate whether counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in part . . . and
shall identify every person or entity, other than the amicus curiae, its members, or
its counsel, who made such a monetary contribution. The disclosure shall be made
in the first footnote on the first page of text.
SUP. CT. R. 37.6. Supreme Court rules explicitly distinguish between governmental and nongovernmental entities by placing more stringent requirements on non-governmental amici. Supreme
Court Rule 37.6 reflects the court’s interest in evaluating bias on the part of amici.
54
Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 785. Between 1969 and 1981 the Court denied only 91 of
832 motions to file for leave to file an amicus curiae. Id.
55
SUP. CT. R. 37.1.
56
Tony Mauro, Bench Pressed, AMERICAN LAW., Apr. 15, 2005, available at http://www.law.
com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1113296708400 (quoting statements by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg concerning amicus participation).
57
See Akins v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 146 F.3d 1049, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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third parties is, in our view, tacit recognition that most matters before the
justices have vast social, political, and economic ramifications—far
beyond the interest of the immediate parties.”58 Just as interest groups
have mobilized in Congress, they are lobbying before the Supreme Court
as amici.59
Although amici are represented in all types of Supreme Court
litigation, they are most visible in cases that involve contentious and
politically salient issues like abortion, eminent domain, free speech, capital
punishment, and affirmative action.60 These cases generate unusually large
numbers of amicus briefs and political fervor.61 This is one of the most
important findings from an empirical survey conducted by Joseph Kearney
and Thomas Merrill.62 This finding indicates that in politically salient
cases, the Court operates most like a quasi-representative body and reflects
the norm of democratic inclusion.63 Washington v. Glucksberg and Roper
v. Simmons, which are explored in greater detail in Part VI, fall into this
category of cases.64
III. AMICUS PARTICIPATION AS SYMBOLIC REASSURANCE
OF DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION
A. Symbolic Reassurance
Democratic procedures serve as a proxy for legitimacy. Specifically,
amicus curiae participation provides symbolic reassurance of the Court’s
receptiveness to the norm of democratic inclusion. In this sense, “men
may dislike a winning candidate, law, or judge’s decision, yet be reassured
by the forms of the election, legislature, or the court.”65 In the judicial
context, democratic inclusion provides that persons impacted by decisions
should participate in the lawmaking process.
The routinization
58

Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 783.
Although the actual degree of influence amicus briefs have is difficult to quantify, the lofty
expense and resources required in filing such briefs, at a minimum, suggests that groups filing amicus
briefs believe they have some instrumental impact. Some commentators suggest that the cost of filing
an amicus brief can range from $15,000 to $60,000. See Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests, supra
note 19, at 1112; see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 801–19 (examining the impact of amici
briefs through the legal model, which predicts that the Court is influenced by briefs that present
especially valued information but not by briefs that are merely repetitive of the parties’ briefs).
60
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 754–56 (categorizing the cases since 1970 that have
generated twenty or more amicus briefs).
61
Id.
62
See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13.
63
Less salient political issues such as business and market regulation, although important, do not
generate the same attention from amici. Ironically, there is anecdotal evidence that the Court finds
amicus briefs exploring technical areas of the law more useful than constitutional arguments where the
Court has ample expertise. See Lynch, supra note 13, at 42. From the Court’s perspective, briefs filed
in less politically salient cases might address technical issues where the Court lacks expertise.
64
For a discussion of the significance of these cases within the scope of this Article, see infra Part
VI.
65
MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 12 (1985).
59
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characteristic of modern amicus participation creates the impression,
whether actual or perceived, that groups have the opportunity to weigh in
on judicial decisions that have broad social and political ramifications.
Arguably, the Supreme Court and its decisions—with majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions along with supporting rationale, deserve greater
respect than pronouncements from other government branches whose
procedures may appear more ad hoc, arbitrary, less transparent, and less
independent. The process of amicus curiae participation provides an
additional layer of legitimacy and illustrates that the Court’s “judicial
authority might best be reconceived as a relationship of trust that courts
forge with the American people.”66 In this sense, the Court’s multiple
constituencies coalesce around procedures that, irrespective of their
tangible impact, symbolize elements of fairness. From this perspective, the
Court’s legitimacy is viewed primarily through a procedural lens rather
than a substantive one. Yet, despite much disagreement concerning the
shape of substantive judicial outcomes, democratic procedures add to the
legitimacy—or promote the acquiescence—of the Court’s rulings.
Democratic features in the judicial context are especially compelling
because they provide symbolic reassurance for threatened or vulnerable
groups who lack political capital in other venues such as Congress where
political spoils go to the well-funded and well-organized. Democratic
theorists espouse the value of citizen participation in the “design and
implementation of policies that affect them.”67 This value includes not
only the prospect of better substantive legal outcomes via discursive
debate, but also the enhanced legitimacy of such reforms. Amicus
participation provides a “deliberative forum” for groups excluded from the
legislative process.68 The absence or retraction of this participatory
mechanism might result in discontent and exclusion.
The fair adjudication of cases alone will not always enhance the
Court’s legitimacy. The Supreme Court’s legitimacy hinges upon the
perception among multiple constituencies. Without a favorable perception
among the polity, the Supreme Court loses it credibility as an arbiter of
disputes or, even worse, becomes viewed as an agent of oppression.69 And
“[s]ince most societies claim to offer their citizens equal justice under the
law, the courts are presumed repositories of equality and the solemn fora
for the just adjudication of the law without regard to race, creed, color,
appearance, or any other categorical distinction.”70 Therefore, the
symbolism of broad amicus participation reinforces the Supreme Court’s
66

Post, supra note 11, at 11.
William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal
Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 175 (2004) (describing associative democracy).
68
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 42 (1996).
69
See Peterson, supra note 11, at 176 (noting the importance of the courts being perceived as
just).
70
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, SHADES OF FREEDOM 130 (1996).
67
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institutional legitimacy.
Despite the benefits of symbolism, fair questions remain as to whether
(i) there is a gap between democratic symbolism and democratic reality,
and (ii) if so, does this present a problem? The answer to the first question
is clearly yes, but the degree of discrepancy may also be relevant. The
answer to the second question is less certain. One can make a credible
argument that affected vulnerable groups are not adequately represented by
amici especially in less politically salient cases. However, a strong
argument can be made that amici adequately reflect vulnerable group
interests especially when one acknowledges the historical use of amicus
participation by civil rights organizations. Without question, amicus
participation provides real democratic benefits to vulnerable groups.
Nonetheless, there is a greater discrepancy between the Court’s democratic
symbolism and democratic reality when compared to other branches of
government (e.g., Congress) characterized by electoral politics. Yet, the
greater discrepancy in the judicial context should be viewed in a positive
light because the Court’s institutional legitimacy is also a function of its
independence that would be undermined if the same degree of interest
group influence prevailed. Moreover, the dichotomy between real
democratic benefits versus symbolic ones may be overstated because
legitimacy is determined from the observer’s socially constructed vantage
point.71 In other words, perception, to a large degree, is reality. Fair and
independent adjudication is a necessity, but not a sufficient condition for
the Court’s legitimacy. The Court is unavoidably an independent body and
a political actor. And the Court’s institutional legitimacy rests on the dual
pillars of inclusion and independence.
B. Defining Legitimacy
Few legal scholars dispute the importance of legitimacy and even
fewer can define it in a concise manner.72 Legitimacy is a complex
71

EDELMAN, supra note 65, at 200.
Although few legal scholars dispute the importance of “legitimacy,” most scholars have
difficulty adequately defining legitimacy in a concise manner. Social scientists have tried to equate
legitimacy with public opinion surveys; however, other scholars contend that such surveys oversimplify
the complex nature of legitimacy. Moreover, some commentators assert that the general public is not
well informed of the Court’s practices and as a result opinion surveys may be misleading. See Richard
Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1825–26 (2005) (discussing the
public’s lack of “sufficient information” about the judiciary). In other words, being a legitimate
institution does not mean people feel that the Justices are currently doing a good job. Richard Fallon
asserts that legitimacy has three separate dimensions: legal, sociological, and moral. See generally id.;
see also David A. Strauss, Legitimacy and Obedience, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1866 (2005) (“To
question the legitimacy of something—a constitution, a statute, a legal regime—is to question whether
it is entitled to obedience.”). Under Fallon’s framework, legal legitimacy is gauged by consistency
with legal norms. A sociologically legitimate decision would be a decision that is accepted as
deserving respect, obedience, or acquiescence. Moral legitimacy is a function of consistency with
moral norms. See Fallon, supra, at 1794–96. Even within these three categories, Fallon identifies
subcategories that reflect the complex nature of legitimacy. For example, sociological legitimacy has
72
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concept, and its measurement is at best a speculative exercise. Despite
measurement difficulties and competing views concerning legitimacy, this
Article maintains that the Court’s institutional legitimacy is enhanced by
broad amicus participation—especially in politically-charged cases.73 For
purposes of this Article, to challenge the legitimacy of the Supreme Court
“is to question whether it is entitled to obedience.”74 In this sense, the
Supreme Court is a legitimate institution because of diffuse support and the
general public’s belief that it is a trustworthy decision maker whose rulings
deserve to be obeyed.75 This perception, in part, stems from procedures
preserving the Court’s independence. Yet the effective functioning of
political institutions also requires the goodwill of the public.
Unlike Congress and the President, the Supreme Court lacks a formal
ongoing connection to the electorate.76 This suggests that the Court “must
depend to an extraordinary extent on the confidence, or at least the
acquiescence, of the public.”77 Despite the formal lack of electoral
three subcategories: (i) institutional legitimacy, i.e., the diffuse public belief that the court is a
trustworthy decision maker whose rulings deserve obedience; (ii) substantive legitimacy, i.e., public
belief that a decision is substantively correct that may vary from group to group; and (iii) authoritative
legitimacy, i.e., a public belief that decisions ought to be obeyed or deserve acquiescence. See id. at
1828. Despite considerable categorization, Fallon acknowledges the limits of sorting legitimacy into
neat linguistic categories and how certain categories may be interrelated. His analysis recognizes that a
decision may be legally correct, but morally illegitimate or vice versa. Nearly twenty years before
Fallon’s legitimacy analysis, Geoffrey Hazard identified four separate aspects of legitimacy: (i) legal
precedent; (ii) right-outcome; (iii) legal realism; and (iv) legal process. See Hazard, supra note 8, at
161–62. Under Hazard’s framework, legal precedent asserts that judicial decisions are legitimate
insofar as they are consistent with precedent. A legal realism basis of legitimacy maintains that
reference to the text of a decision should be augmented by the political, social, and economic
consequences of a decision. See id. at 171. The right outcome basis of legitimacy rests in the Justices’
awareness of their own political viability. The legal process basis for legitimacy can be contrasted with
the legislative process because there is no “log rolling, pork barreling, and substantive compromise”
with the Court’s interpretative practices and procedures. Id. at 183.
73
From another perspective, legitimacy may reflect the belief that particular decisions of the
Court are substantively correct. Substantive legitimacy, however, may vary from group to group, case
to case, and methodology to methodology. Some fear broad amicus participation and subsequent
reliance upon it may increase the risk that a form of judicial activism will result displacing legal
doctrine. A study reported a negative relationship between judicial activism—as measured by the
number of statutes invalidated by the Supreme Court—and public confidence. See Gregory A.
Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209, 1223 (1986) (stating that the “public responds in a negative fashion to
judicial negations of congressional statutes”). The question of whether the invalidation of a statute
reflects judicial activism is a separate issue not argued here.
Thus, one could argue that the Court’s legitimacy should be gauged according to its adherence to
legal doctrine and precedent. But, one could also claim a decision is legitimate because its decisions
reflected legal realism and were augmented by the consideration of circumstantial factors like
economics and politics. See Hazard, supra note 8, at 171–72. Accordingly, “[t]here is too much
controversy among legal elites, and too little informed endorsement among the mass public, to warrant
strong claims of legal legitimacy (as opposed to weak or disputable ones) for the interpretive
methodologies that substantially define the judicial role.” Fallon, supra note 72, at 1827.
74
Strauss, supra note 72, at 1866.
75
See Fallon, supra note 72, at 1828.
76
One must, however, acknowledge the link, albeit tenuous, between the public and the Supreme
Court appointment and confirmation process.
77
Caldeira, supra note 73, at 1209.
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pressures to provide democratic legitimacy, the Court has traditionally
fared well “in the estimations of the public, especially in comparison with
other political institutions.”78 The positive perception is perhaps due to the
Court’s independence. But, amicus participation also heightens the
Court’s legitimacy through allowing participation of interested third parties
and providing a dotted-line link to the electorate. Some political theorists
contend that “[t]he normative legitimacy of a democratic decision depends
on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the
decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to influence the
outcomes.”79 The large number of amicus briefs filed in politicallycharged cases as well as the actual content of the arguments raised within
the briefs illustrate how “interest group amici may genuinely believe that
the court responds to the principles of democratic rule.”80 In this sense, the
Supreme Court engages in a continuous dialogue and exchange with
various constituencies via amicus participation and its opinions. Enhanced
Supreme Court legitimacy as a matter of democratic inclusion may provide
the strongest support for Justice Black’s vision of broad amicus
participation.81
The Court’s role in American democracy demands some knowledge of
public forces and opinion—especially when Justices share policy-making
authority with elected politicians.82 Justices may consider the prospect of
being overridden or ineffective enforcement by the other branches of
government.83 Therefore, “[J]ustices who wish to exert authority over the
direction of American life will anticipate actions of the other branches of
government.”84 In addition, some scholars argue that the Court will avoid
public defeat that would undermine its institutional authority—and as a
result compromise to maintain the institution’s public authority.85 This
does not suggest, however, that the Court pays attention or responds to
public demands like elected officials. Instead, the Court assumes a less
dynamic, more symbolic quasi-representative function.
Although useful, public opinion is an inadequate proxy for legitimacy
because it may oversimplify the complex and nuanced concept of
legitimacy. For example, the public may disagree with a particular
decision, but nonetheless acquiesce and obey the decision out of respect for
78
Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 635 (1992). “Even during the 1960’s, when support for other
institutions plummeted, public evaluations of the Court remained relatively high.” Id. Public
confidence, however, may not be an adequate proxy for legitimacy.
79
See YOUNG, supra note 3, at 5–6.
80
Paul Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation
in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 807, 812 (2004).
81
See supra Part II.B. (discussing modern amicus participation).
82
See James A. Stimson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 543, 555 (1995).
83
See id.
84
Id.
85
Public opinion also plays a role in the appointment and confirmation process. See id.
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the institution. Moreover, the mass public is not that familiar with the
Court and its interpretive practices.86 Whereas public opinion may vary
widely, the Court’s institutional legitimacy is more static.87
The Supreme Court is a proxy for the entire U.S. judicial system and
therefore an integral part of American democracy. As a matter of
constitutional principle the Court “[m]ust be beyond politics,” but it is
unavoidably a political institution.88 The Court’s legitimacy rests with
multiple constituencies and stakeholders. Consequently, the symbolic role
of amicus participation is crucial because “more amicus participation may
also increase the faith in the judicial system [and government] that is
eroding in some quarters today.”89 Despite its imperfections, amicus
participation is beneficial to advocating the public interest90 and promoting
the norm of democratic inclusion, which is a crucial element of the
democratic ideal.91
IV. THE VALUE OF AMICUS BRIEFS92
The existing literature on amicus participation embraces a restrictive
view on the value of amicus participation by correlating the value of
amicus participation to the impact it has on assisting judges rendering a
decision.93 Adopting a broader perspective, this Article contends that such
a restrictive view may both understate and oversimplify the value of
amicus participation to the Supreme Court’s multiple constituencies (e.g.,
the parties, the amici, and the Justices). Accordingly, any discussion of
reforming amicus participation before the Supreme Court (i.e., limiting
access) should contemplate a more expansive view of value that considers
amicus participation’s symbolic reassurance of constituents and its
preservation of institutional legitimacy.

86

See id. at 1825–26.
See Fallon, supra note 72, at 1827–29.
88
Hazard, supra note 8, at 157. According to Hazard, the Court’s role reflects an irreconcilable
contradiction between constitutional principle and institutional fact. The constitutional principle is that
the Court should be independent from primary political authority or should be beyond politics. The
institutional fact is that the Court makes laws as well as applies them. The amicus brief is a crude
device that has morphed into a multi-purpose instrument that helps reconcile the Court’s role as an
independent body and political actor. See id. at 153–57.
89
Garcia, supra note 12, at 358.
90
See Schachter, supra note 16, at 143–44 (discussing the positive effect of amicus representation
on unrepresented and under privileged parties).
91
See YOUNG, supra note 3, at 125.
92
Part IV focuses on amicus participation at the merits stage because the decision of whether a
court will grant a petition of certiorari is generally limited. This section also focuses on the broader
value of amicus participation to the parties, amici, and the Court. Finally, this section makes the
distinction between potential value as opposed to influence on the Court’s decisional outcomes.
93
But, without actual citations or discussion in Court opinions, determining the actual influence
of amici on judges can be a speculative exercise. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
87
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A. Value to the Parties
1. Endorsement
A common question surrounding amicus briefs is how much
informational or strategic value they offer.
Independent of legal
argumentation, an amicus brief may serve as a group endorsement of a
particular party or outcome in the hope that political pressure will bolster a
party’s case. Within the amicus brief and a motion for leave to file an
amicus brief, groups (regardless of whether parties grant consent) indicate
their “size, status, and expertise” through a required “statement of
interest.”94 This “statement of interest” allows amici to communicate
information about the political, social, economic consequences of the
Court's decision as well as the legitimacy of their cause.95 In such cases,
groups may add their own prestige to the primary litigant’s case or signal
the presence of widespread and diverse support. For example, anecdotal
evidence shows Supreme Court clerks give the ACLU’s amicus briefs
more consideration on account of their perceived superiority.96 As one
former Supreme Court clerk indicated, certain groups, such as the ACLU,
are habitual filers and always make the “first cut” of amicus review.97 This
perception among clerks is, in part, due to organizational reputation and
expertise.98
Generally, the most cited amicus briefs come from frequent filers.99
“Repeat players” are more likely to have an impact because they develop
expertise and have access to specialists.100 Amici are more likely to attract
the Court’s attention if the organization or its attorneys have a strong and
extensive record of Supreme Court advocacy.101 Endorsement by reputable
amici arguably bolsters a party’s standing.
2. Supplementary Strategies
a. Bolstering a Party’s Weak Legal Argumentation and Resources
Some amicus briefs serve an important function by providing legal
guidance for the Court when the principal litigant lacks the legal talent of
94

Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 786.
Id.
96
See Lynch, supra note 13, at 49.
97
See id.
98
See id. (noting that “a few clerks noted an ideological preference for ACLU briefs”). Others
clerks commented that the ACLU has experienced litigators who tend to raise salient legal arguments.
Id.
99
See Susan Hedman, Friends of the Earth and Friends of the Court: Assessing the Impact of
Interest Group Amici Curiae in Environmental Cases Decided by the Supreme Court, 10 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 187, 196, 204 (1991) (discussing how this benefit is derived by “repeat players”).
100
Id. For example, Pacific Legal Foundation is the most active amicus filer in environmental
cases and is at the forefront of an expanding conservative interest group movement. Id.
101
See id. (“[A]mici should retain counsel with a strong record of Supreme Court advocacy to
increase their persuasive force.”).
95
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the amici.
Amicus briefs, especially those from the government, can
“buttress” a party’s weak presentation and even forward an argument not
pursued by the parties.103 These situations often occur when there is a stark
contrast between the principal litigant and the amici in legal expertise and
resources. In this sense, amici are crucial to articulating the public interest
“both as a means of urging justice for underprivileged factions and in order
to rebut opposing positions.”104 For example, in Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego, the City of San Diego sought to exclude billboards in certain areas
of the City on grounds of traffic safety and aesthetics, but the billboards
were a mix of commercial and political messages.105 Since the billboard
owners were not in a position to argue credibly on behalf of political
speech because they themselves did not engage in political speech, their
attorney requested that the ACLU file an amicus brief emphasizing the
political speech aspects of the case.106 In a close decision, the Court
ultimately ruled the ordinance was unconstitutional because it regulated
political speech.107 Here, the billboard owners advanced their cause by
enlisting the resources and support of the ACLU.108
b. Presenting Subtle Variations or Emotive Arguments
Even when the representation for the principal litigants is relatively
adequate, amicus curiae may still perform an important “subsidiary
role.”109 In this role, amici present “subtle variations of the basic
argument, or emotive and even questionable arguments that might result in
a successful verdict, but are too risky to be embraced by the principal
litigant.”110 By injecting these arguments via amicus briefs, “[a] minimum
102
103

See Krislov, supra note 13, at 711.
James L. Cooper, The Solicitor General and the Evolution of Activism, 65 IND. L.J. 675, 691

(1990).

104

Schachter, supra note 16, at 143.
453 U.S. 490, 493–98.
106
Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 603, 607 (1984). Id. at 493.
107
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 521.
108
See Ennis, supra note 106, at 607. In “Toll v. Moreno, the World Bank submitted an amicus
brief urging the Supreme Court to rule, on Supremacy Clause grounds, that certain state statutes which
disadvantaged alien college students were unconstitutional.” Id. at 606 (citing Toll v. Moreno, 458
U.S. 1 (1982)). Ultimately, the Court ruled for the students on the basis of the Supremacy Clause
theory that had been discussed mainly by the amici. Id. at 606. In Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, the Nollans—beach-front property owners—challenged the validity of a building permit
provision that required property owners to give the public access to their land to pass from one public
beach to another. 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see also Hedman, supra note 99, at 195. In Nollan, the
building industry amici worked closely with the parties asserting takings claims to coordinate the
content of briefs and to help the parties’ attorneys with moot court sessions. See id at 196.
Furthermore, Justice Scalia cited twenty cases and notes the source for the list of citations as the amicus
brief sponsored jointly by the National Association of Homebuilders and the California Building
Industry. Id. at 196–97. In establishing the new legal rule, the Court noted that it was relying on legal
authority contained exclusively in the amicus brief of an interest group. Id at 197. This suggests that
interest group amici had a critical “impact” on the Nollan court’s majority and, concomitantly, the
evolution of land use. Id.
109
Krislov, supra note 13, at 711.
110
Id.
105
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[of] disapprobation attaches to the official cause.”
Simply stated,
arguments that may anger the Justices, unorthodox legal theories, vast
amounts of social science data, and emotive appeals are perhaps better
suited for amici than the immediate parties.112
B. Value to Amici
1. Counteractive Lobbying
Interest groups may submit amicus briefs, despite the ideological or
partisan composition of the Court, to counteract other amici. For example,
in a situation where the composition of the Court would appear to almost
guarantee a decision in a group’s favor, interest groups may still have an
incentive to submit briefs to counteract the influence of opposition
groups.113 Although most research explaining this phenomenon focuses on
the legislative context, it is nonetheless instructive for the Supreme Court
context in which amici must strategically consider the efforts of competing
groups when attempting to influence three types of decision makers—those
predisposed to favor the group’s position, those predisposed to disapprove,
and those who are uncommitted.114 The popularity of the amicus brief as a
lobbying tool may stem from the fact that amicus participation is a less
expensive alternative than standard lobbying or a publicity campaign.115
Similarly, when compared to filing a separate lawsuit, amicus participation
may be a more effective strategy because it lacks the procedural
complexity of a separate lawsuit and is less expensive.116 Although
lobbying the Court may still place certain groups with fewer organizational
resources at a disadvantage, the Court nonetheless is more democratic
given the presence of amici.117 Moreover, a credible argument can be
111

Id. at 711–12.
See id.
113
See generally David Austen-Smith & John R. Wright, Counteractive Lobbying, 38 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 25 (1994).
114
Commentators also acknowledge that groups have other reasons for filing briefs such as
showing the groups importance to its own members even if there is little evidence that a brief will
influence judicial outcomes. See Collins, supra note 80, at 825–26. The relatively low costs of amicus
participation make this possible. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
115
Schachter, supra note 16, at 116.
116
See id. at 117 (discussing the complexity of joinder and intervention in the context of class
actions).
117
Commentators acknowledge how amici have a democratizing influence on the Court, but also
cite certain drawbacks:
Increasing technological complexity and the need for information will likely make
the U.S. Supreme Court a more democratic place, but the democracy that will
flourish in the marble palace will be pluralistic, and organized interests with
significant lobbying strengths in those other branches will exercise considerably
more influence than those less well endowed. Thus, lobbying the Court will
continue to become more akin to lobbying the legislatures, and groups with fewer
organizational resources will not likely overcome their political disadvantages by
entering the judicial arena.
SUZANNE U. SAMUELS, FIRST AMONG FRIENDS 221 (2004).
112
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made that certain amici such as LDF and the ACLU do reflect the interests
of vulnerable groups.
2. Highlighting Externalities or Silently Impacting Other Contexts
Different organizations do not enter the fray of amicus participation on
the same terms. For example, for organizations such as the NAACP and
the ACLU, it is their business to litigate on behalf of groups. In other
scenarios, the amici’s connection to the immediate parties can be indirect
or tenuous at best. Yet, amicus participation may bring the consequences
of a decision on discrete interests or third parties to the attention of the
Court.118 In this sense, amicus participation provides a vehicle for discrete
interests, who either lack standing or are unaccomplished litigators, to
lobby the Court and perhaps raise its awareness of third parties and the
effect of a decision beyond its immediate context.119 Groups may also
desire third party consequences and outcomes, but choose not to alert the
Court. By planting language and arguments in the instant case, groups can
strategically advance their cause in other contexts. For instance, a pro-life
group may participate as an amici in a physician-assisted suicide case
(without mention of the abortion issue) understanding that a favorable
disposition may undermine the pro-choice position in the abortion
context.120 Thus, the arguments made by amici may only be a pretext for a
group’s true motivations or intended results.
3.

Signaling Amici’s Involvement to its Own Members, Potential
Members, and Other Organizations

Interest groups have other motivations than to simply influence the
Supreme Court’s output. The existing amicus participation literature fails
to adequately explain or entertain the secondary motivations of multiple
stakeholders. One study of amicus participation has determined that
coalition amicus briefs may not play a statistically significant role in
increasing success before the Supreme Court, and as a result, interest

118
In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), a particular amicus brief filed by former
prominent military personnel attracted significant attention from the Court. See Sylvia H. Walbolt &
Joseph H. Lang Jr., Amicus Briefs Revisited, 33 STETSON L. REV. 171, 177 (2003). The brief did not
simply replicate the legal arguments in each party’s brief. Rather, this brief introduced an entirely
unique factual perspective by articulating the “importance of race-conscious admissions and recruiting
practices of service academies and the ROTC.” Id. at 179. In addition, this amicus brief was
particularly compelling because it was presented during a period of armed conflict when the Nation’s
attention was focused on the war in Iraq. See id. Here, the amici prompted the Court to consider the
consequences of the decision “outside the narrow scope of one particular university’s admissions
procedures.” Id. at 180. Similarly, in a right to die case, the AMA may not argue the law as much as
the policy burden on doctors and medical ethics because they have no direct interest in the parties
involved in the case. See discussion infra Part V.A.
119
The brief submitted by the women’s groups in Washington v. Glucksberg is an example. See
discussion infra Part V.A.
120
See discussion infra Part VI.A.1.b.iii.
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groups may have other motivations.
Interest groups are always
interested in satisfying their current membership, attracting additional
membership, and building relationships with similarly aligned
organizations. Thus, amici coalition briefs are a low-cost mechanism for
showing a group’s members and potential members that the organization is
actively pursuing policy goals and wielding influence in the judicial
arena.122 In addition, coalition amici activity is a low cost method for
group interaction and collaboration.
C. Value to the Court
1. Information Gathering
One can argue that amicus briefs alleviate costly information gathering
which adds to the stability of the political system.123 Governmental and
non-governmental organizations have access to a plethora of information
that is not readily available to the Court.124 By providing supplemental
information, amici can preserve judicial resources whereas repetitive
information may do the opposite. Amicus participation provides valuable
information in two principle ways: (i) acting as barometer for interest
group activity and public opinion125 and (ii) providing supplemental
substantive legal, policy, and social science arguments.126
a. The Barometer Function
Amicus participation serves as a crude barometer of public opinion,
particularly in politically-charged cases. However, unlike public opinion
surveys and other fora where interest groups participate, amicus briefs are
more focused on case related issues and the audience is more clearly
defined via the statement of interest.127 Justices can acquire information
about societal demand and significance by observing the extent of amicus
121

See Collins, supra note 80, at 825–26.
See id.
123
See Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests, supra note 19, at 1123.
124
See Collins, supra note 80, at 808–13 (asserting the so-called information hypothesis that
amicus briefs are effective because of the additional information they provide litigants and offering
anecdotal evidence that Justices pay attention to interest groups ‘supporting briefs’).
125
See id. at 814. (“Thus, the affected groups hypothesis holds that it is not the social scientific,
legal, or political arguments briefs contain that influence the court, but instead the mere presence of a
large number of interest on one side of the dispute relative to another.”).
126
See id. at 814–15. Information theory maintains that the value of amicus briefs is not merely
as a proxy for interest group activity, but the actual arguments legal and otherwise contained in the
briefs. See Amici Curiae Briefs: The Court’s Perspective 181–83 (dividing informational value into
three categories: (i) supplemental or new information; (ii) implications of decisions; and (iii)
identifying important cases).
127
A study of amici participation at the certiorari stage asserted that the informational value of
briefs lies in their presence or absence and not necessarily in their substantive arguments advanced.
See Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests, supra note 19, at 1113. Contrary to what many
organizations may think, studies indicate opposition briefs at the certiorari stage significantly increase
the likelihood that certiorari will be granted. Instead of decreasing the court’s interest, opposition
briefs may pique it.
122
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128

participation.
However, the exact degree of responsiveness the Justices
exhibit when selecting their dockets or rendering a decision remains
uncertain.129
b. Substantive Information
Beyond signaling interest group or public support, amici also provide
valuable information in the form of substantive legal, policy and social
science arguments. Amicus brief submission is the most widely used
method for submitting social science data as non-record evidence.130
However, some commentators argue that the politicization of amicus briefs
is alarming because Justices do not have an adequate mechanism for
independently assessing the claims, the research, and the evidence
submitted.131 From this perspective, the Justices are vulnerable to being
“misled” by politically distorted social science data.132 Notwithstanding
these criticisms, amici continue to lend support to the Court in this
manner.133
Scholars further speculate that information presented to the Court via
amici will become increasingly influential. For example, cases involving
highly technical issues, such as new reproductive technologies that have
only been heard in lower federal and state courts, will eventually reach the
Court.134 While seeking to understand these complex issues, the Justices
will rely on information provided by medical, scientific, and legal experts
about the nature of these technologies and the role of social norms and
traditions in determining issues like parental status.135 Anecdotal evidence
indicates that amicus briefs addressing specialized areas of law (e.g., tax,
bankruptcy) provide valuable guidance to the Court whereas briefs
reiterating constitutional arguments made by the parties are of lesser
value.136
128
See Lucius T. Barker, Third Parties in Litigation: A Systemic View of the Judicial Function, 29
J. POL. 41, 56 (1967) (“The amicus brief, in a sense, also allows the Court to weigh ‘political’
information in a judicial way.”).
129
See Jonathan Alger & Marvin Krislov, You’ve Got to Have Friends: Lessons Learned From
the Role of Amici in the University of Michigan Cases, 30 J.C. & U.L. 503, 528 (2004) (“Amicus briefs
can also be helpful if central, unifying themes emerge from the cacophony of voices in front of the
court. In this respect, amicus briefs that focus solely on external organizations’ own agendas are not as
helpful as briefs that highlight the broader societal impact . . . .”).
130
See id.
131
See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 93–94.
132
Id. at 94.
133
For example, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court discussed the treatment of juvenile death
penalty in other nations and revealed that “all information regarding foreign death penalty laws is
drawn from [the Appendix to the] Brief for Amnesty International as Amicus Curiae . . . and from
Death Penalty in Various Countries, prepared by members of the staff of the Law Library of the
Library of Congress.” Luther T. Munford, When Does the Curiae Need an Amicus?, 1 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 279, 281 n.12 (1999).
134
See SAMUELS, supra note 117, at 219.
135
See id.; see also Lynch, supra note 13, at 41 (describing how clerks found amicus briefs
addressing technical issues among the most useful).
136
See Lynch, supra note 13, at 41–42 (stating that “there exists a positive correlation between
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Unlike other forms of evidence that have been presented and
challenged throughout the litigation process, evidence contained in amicus
briefs is not subject to cross-examination or expert testimony from either
side.137 Amicus briefs lack the safeguards characteristic of other forms of
evidence. Parties, however, do receive the briefs and have the opportunity
to respond or rebut information, facts, and arguments contained in the
briefs. Nonetheless, such a task may be unduly burdensome and drain
resources. Furthermore, amici, unlike the parties, do not have to work
from a trial record or preserve issues for appeal. These concerns, however,
are mitigated via (i) disclosure requirements under Supreme Court Rules to
identify potential bias; (ii) the conservation of judicial resources via
information gathering; and (iii) the skill of the Justices and their clerks.138
In the absence of rules restricting access, the Court has developed its own
filtering mechanisms for analyzing amicus briefs139 and, upon occasion,
provided informal guidance to potential filers concerning the Court’s (or
Justices’) preferences.140 Ultimately, the usefulness of findings and
arguments presented in amicus briefs hinges on their adequate
evaluation.141
2. Legitimacy
Legitimacy is rarely mentioned in the legal literature addressing
amicus participation, but its importance cannot be ignored. The normative
basis for broad amicus participation as currently practiced in not simply
informational value. The Court’s institutional legitimacy depends on both
norms of inclusion and independence. Amicus participation contributes to
the former.142
V. WHO PARTICIPATES AS AMICI
This section focuses on the dynamics of amicus participation—who,
when, and why amici participate. The Supreme Court is accessible to a
wide array of interests via amicus participation. This broad participation
reinforces democratic norms of inclusion. Often entities become amici
because they lack direct litigant status, they fail to meet the standard for
intervention,143 or simply because of the advantages that amicus status
brings (i.e., flexibility and cost). Some organizations may not have the
legal obscurity of [the] subject matter and the helpfulness of amicus participation”).
137
See id.
138
Schacter, supra note 16, at 136, 143–44.
139
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Supreme Court clerks play a filtering role for amicus filings.
See Lynch, supra note 13, at 43–46. A number of factors may determine the degree of review a brief
receives include, but are not limited to: the reputation of the filer, the substantive nature of the case, and
Court workload.
140
See Mauro, supra note 56 (discussing comments of Justices concerning amicus briefs).
141
See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 99.
142
See discussion supra Part III.B.
143
See FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
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resources to achieve their goals through litigation or an organization may
not find a suitable plaintiff to represent at the trial stage. For such groups,
amicus participation can provide a rare opportunity to affect policy at the
top. In 1982 alone, the Supreme Court had over 3000 amici representing
over 1400 distinct organizations.144 Generally, amici fall into two broad
categories—non-governmental and governmental entities.145
A. Non-Governmental Entities
The broad category of non-governmental entities includes a myriad of
subcategories: individuals; charitable and community organizations; public
interest law firms and policy research groups; citizen and public interest
advocacy groups; business, trade, and professional organizations; and
unions.146 These organizations are very diverse in their membership,
ideology, resources, focus, and flexibility. For example, the principal
function of public interest advocacy organizations such as the LDF,
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (“LCCRUL”), and ACLU
is litigation. Meanwhile, for community organizations such as the Boy
Scouts, professional organizations such as the American Medical
Association (“AMA”), and unions like the AFL-CIO, litigation does not
constitute the bulk of their activities, but when it does, it usually takes the
form of amicus participation.147 Even within organizational categories
there is significant differentiation. Whereas LDF confines itself to issues
related to racial and ethnic discrimination, the ACLU litigates a broader
range of issues. It is important to note that organizations may have a direct
or indirect interest in a case’s outcome. An organization may support a
party only because an unfavorable decision in the instant case may have
consequences in other contexts. For instance, a pro-life interest group may
weigh in on an issue such as physician-assisted suicide only because of the
potential implications in the abortion context.148
B. Governmental Entities
Governmental entities participate more than other groups of amici.
These entities include state, county, district, municipal, and the federal
government (e.g., the Solicitor General).149 In fact, individual states alone
participate more than other groups at both stages of amicus participation.150
144

Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 789.
Supreme Court Rule 37 makes a similar distinction by imposing greater filing requirements on
non-governmental entities. SUP. CT. R. 37.
146
See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 791 (providing a table classifying amici by type of
organization).
147
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 807–08.
148
See discussion infra Part VI.A.
149
Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 791.
150
Id. at 793–94. States account for approximately over one-third of amicus participation at the
agenda setting stage and a quarter of amici at the plenary stage. Id.
145
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According to one study, state amici filed briefs in 14.5% of cases from
1946 to 1995.151 As previously mentioned, Supreme Court Rules impose
fewer filing restrictions on governmental entities favoring the participation
of governmental amici. Widespread state participation is also related to the
wide reach of Court decisions. Whenever the Supreme Court addresses the
constitutionality of a statute with statewide application, the Supreme Court
considers the view taken by a state or its agents as “highly relevant.”152
For example, when a state’s assisted suicide law is under constitutional
scrutiny, not just that state will participate, but every other state with a
similar law will also attempt to influence the Court’s decision.153 The high
degree of state participation is evidence of intergovernmental lobbying of
the Supreme Court.154
The most influential governmental entity, however, is the Office of the
Solicitor General.155 The Solicitor General, the Government’s chief
litigator before the Supreme Court, is appointed by the President.156 The
United States (or the Solicitor General) is the most successful as well as
the most frequent amici before the Court.157 The Solicitor General has
151

Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 753 n.25.
See New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 245, 248 n.1 (1984) (acknowledging that the position
taken by a state attorney in an amicus brief provided additional support for the conclusion that a grant
of certiorari was improvident).
153
See discussion infra Part VI.A.; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–30
(1997) (analyzing whether assisted suicide violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
154
See discussion infra Part VI.
155
According to the Kearney study, the Solicitor General filed briefs in sixteen percent of cases
(991 cases) from 1946–95. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 753 n.25. Moreover, the Solicitor
General’s amicus briefs are cited most frequently by the Court. In fact, the Court cited the Solicitor
General as amici in “[forty percent] of cases in which the Solicitor General filed a brief” between 1946
and 1995 (402 cases). Id. at 760.
156
The functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are as follows:
The task of the Office of the Solicitor General is to supervise and conduct
government litigation in the United States Supreme Court. Virtually all such
litigation is channeled through the Office of the Solicitor General and is actively
conducted by the Office. The United States is involved in approximately two-thirds
of all the cases the U.S. Supreme Court decides on the merits each year.
The Solicitor General determines the cases in which Supreme Court review will
be sought by the government and the positions the government will take before the
Court. The Office’s staff attorneys, Deputy Solicitors General and Assistants to the
Solicitor General, participate in preparing the petitions, briefs, and other papers filed
by the government in the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General conducts the oral
arguments before the Supreme Court. Those cases not argued by the Solicitor
General personally are assigned either to an Assistant to the Solicitor General or to
another government attorney. The vast majority of government cases are argued by
the Solicitor General or one of the office attorneys.
Another responsibility of the Office is to review all cases decided adversely to
the government in the lower courts to determine whether they should be appealed
and, if so, what position should be taken. Moreover, the Solicitor General
determines whether the government will participate as an amicus curiae, or
intervene, in cases in any appellate court.
Office of the Solicitor General, About the Office of the Soliciter General,
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/about_us.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2009) (discussing the functions of the
Office of the Solicitor General).
157
See Karen O’Connor, The Amicus Curiae Role of the U.S. Solicitor General in Supreme Court
152
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monopolistic authority to choose whether the government will litigate, how
the government will litigate, and how legal resources will be allocated.
The Solicitor General’s decision to allocate resources toward arguing as
amicus curiae in lieu of litigating cases where the agencies are directly
involved potentially “exacerbates the risks of political partisanship . . . .”158
The decision to file an amicus brief is largely a discretionary exercise. The
Solicitor General can submit an amicus brief any time a federal interest can
be shown in a case.159 Supreme Court Rule 37.4 does not require the
Solicitor General to acquire consent from either of the parties.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court “often invites the Solicitor General to file
an amicus brief in order to ascertain the opinion and otherwise unavailable
information” from the federal government or the executive branch.160
Approximately one-third of the United States’ participation as amicus
curiae is the result of Court invitation.161
Amicus participation may present an opportunity for the Solicitor
General’s Office to interject the partisan ideology of the executive branch
at the expense of the individual agencies.162 The Solicitor General’s
ambiguous and unique role leads critics to question his ultimate allegiance
because the office embodies an agency problem that only worsens when
filing amicus briefs.163 The most evident connection the Solicitor General
has is to the President who appoints him. The President may exert both
direct and indirect influences on the Solicitor General’s activities. The
need for monitoring by the President is mitigated by the fact that the
President usually appoints individuals who share the President’s views.164
Litigation, 66 JUDICATURE 256, 261 (1983) (“[T]he solicitor general’s success rate as amicus curiae
surpasses the high win-loss ratio that the government enjoys as a party to a suit.”); see also Todd
Lochner, The Relationship Between the Office of Solicitor General and the Independent Agencies: A
Reevaluation, 79 VA. L. REV. 549, 561 (1993) (“By far[,] the most frequent amici before the Court, the
United States, is also one of the most successful.”); Lynch, supra note 13, at 46 (“Approximately 70%
of the seventy clerks interviewed emphatically cited the solicitor general as the most important filer.”).
158
Lochner, supra note 157, at 551.
159
See Lynch, supra note 13, at 47 (“[T]he government need not seek the permission of the
litigants in order to file an amicus brief.”).
160
Lochner, supra note 157, at 561.
161
Id.
162
A counter-argument to this claim is that the President appoints the various agency heads and
this lessens the need for partisan excess by the Solicitor General.
163
The government has wide discretion to enter any case and take any substantive position. See
Cooper, supra note 103, at 680, 685 (“[W]here the government acts sua sponte it does not confront the
barriers that other parties do.”). The Solicitor General may file amicus briefs that differ from the
positions taken by the various agencies.
164
See id. at 681. For example, when President Lyndon B. Johnson offered the Solicitor
Generalship to Thurgood Marshall, “he complimented Marshall’s ability as a lawyer and said he
needed an outstanding legal mind to represent him before the Supreme Court.” JUAN WILLIAMS,
THURGOOD MARSHALL: AN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 314–15 (1998) (emphasis added). Johnson
also was very clear about making no explicit future promises about a Supreme Court appointment: “I
want that distinctly understood—there’s no quid pro quo here at all. You do your job. If you don’t do
it, you go out. If you do it, you stay here. And that’s all there is to it.” Id. Moreover, when Johnson
heard of Marshall’s plans to commute from New York, he articulated his disapproval. See id. at 318.
Almost three weeks later Marshall sent the President a note expressing his plans to move his family to
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Furthermore, “in many amicus appearances, the issues are rather apolitical
and unlikely to be of special interest to the President.”165
The federal government’s submission of amicus briefs has increased
over time.166 Between 1966 and 1977 amicus briefs constituted only
twenty percent of the federal government’s participation before the
Supreme Court.167 Today, as much as forty-five percent of the Solicitor
General’s argumentation is through amicus submission.168 Surprisingly,
the United States has a higher success rate when it participates as amici as
opposed to participating as a party. According to some studies, the United
States’ view prevails in approximately seventy-five percent of the cases in
which it participates as amici.169 An amicus brief from the Solicitor
General’s office is a political barometer from which the Court can
ascertain the likely executive reaction.170 In Brown, the Solicitor General’s
amicus brief provided the Court with the needed assurance that the chief
executive supported an order ruling against segregation.171
The Solicitor General may have other important goals for filing amicus
briefs besides espousing executive ideology that may include providing the
Court with unavailable information,172 presenting her own views on
important government issues,173 protecting the government who may be a
party in interest, articulating a singular government voice,174 and providing
a flexible strategy for dealing with agencies.175 Other factors supporting
the Solicitor General’s broad discretionary power include the fact that the
Solicitor General’s staff are regarded as among the best attorneys in the
country and that the Solicitor General plays a crucial role by decreasing the

Washington, D.C. See id. In August of 1965, Thurgood Marshall became the 33rd Solicitor General in
U.S. history. Although the above is an anecdotal reference, it nonetheless suggests the influence and
allegiance between the President and the Solicitor General as well as the tenuous connection between
the Solicitor General and the administrative agencies.
165
Cooper, supra note 103, at 681.
166
The Solicitor General’s use of the amicus brief began in 1909; however, amicus participation
remained infrequent until the 1950s. See Lochner, supra note 157, at 561.
167
Id. at 561.
168
Id.
169
Id. However, the success rate varies with the particular Solicitor General.
170
Id. at 562.
171
Id.; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding a University of Michigan admissions policy despite government opposition
as amici).
172
The Government’s resources are vast. They include unpublished studies from various agencies
as well as congressional transcripts.
173
Elana Kagan became the first woman to serve as Solicitor General of the United States in
2009. See Office of the Solicitor General, supra note 156.
174
Commentators argue that the Solicitor General must take a broader view than the parochial
view of an individual agency; and even if a narrow viewpoint is required, the Solicitor General, in all
likelihood is in the best position to do it. See Lochner, supra note 157, at 570.
175
Id. at 562. For example, in Bob Jones University v. United States, the Court requested an
amicus brief from the Solicitor General “when the government and the taxpayer took the same view of
the legislation at issue.” Philip B. Kurland & Dennis J. Hutchinson, With Friends Like These . . . , 70
A.B.A. J. 16, 20 (1984) (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)).
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Court’s workload.
The latter “gatekeeper” function is perhaps the most
important.177 The Solicitor General’s influence is indisputable in both
agenda setting and asserting the Government’s position at the merits phase
of Supreme Court litigation.
C. When Groups Enter as Amici
At the Supreme Court, there is a fairly constant “mix of interest
representation across institutional contexts.”178 Approximately thirty
percent of all amicus activity occurs at the certiorari or agenda setting
stage.179 In general, governmental entities and business groups are more
active than other organizations at the agenda setting stage. As a result, one
would expect governmental entities and business groups to play a larger
role in setting the Court’s agenda.180 Some argue that this discrepancy may
be due in part to informational advantages.181 Public choice accounts of
interest group participation also support this result.182 The majority of
amicus participation, however, takes place at the merits phase where the
discrepancies between governmental entities and non-governmental
participation become less pronounced.183 Most organizations participate at
the merits phase rather than the agenda setting stage, due in part to cost
effectiveness, but also due to the fact that cases become more visible once
the Court grants certiorari.184 Accordingly, citizen groups and public
interest law firms allocate most of their resources toward the merits phase.
Once cases appear on the Court’s docket, organizations can prepare more
effectively, and the stakes rise as well.185 At the later merits stage, amicus
participation becomes more pluralistic symbolizing democratic
inclusion.186
The different strategies governmental entities and non-governmental
entities use to determine when and how to participate as amici may be a

176
Lochner, supra note 157, at 570. The resumes of recent Solicitor General’s such as Seth
Waxman, Walter Dellinger, and Ted Olsen add to the prestige and perception of the office.
177
Cooper, supra note 103, at 682 (1990) (noting that the Court has acknowledged the importance
of this function both publicly and privately).
178
Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 797.
179
Id. at 803. See also SUP. CT. R. 10. (outlining the procedure for reviewing requests for
certiorari, as well as the writ approval process).
180
See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 797.
181
See id. at 793 (noting the existence of institutionalized forms of communication among
government units).
182
See Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
1040, 1044 (John Eatwell et. al. eds., 1987).
183
See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 801.
184
See id. at 792.
185
See id. at 792–93.
186
The character of the information and the nature of the influence may shift depending on the
particular stage of litigation. See David Austen-Smith, Information and Influence: Lobbying for
Agendas and Votes, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 800, 825 (1993) (concluding that lobbying Congress is more
effective at agenda setting stage).
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function of organizational concerns such as cost effectiveness,187
constituencies, and information asymmetries.188 Instead of pooling
resources and filing coalition briefs, the general pattern is for groups, both
governmental and non-governmental, to file multiple separate briefs, which
are more costly.189 But more coalition activity occurs with governmental
entities, especially among states.190 This may suggest some form of
signaling that groups value. Coalition briefs give the appearance of
widespread, diverse, and prestigious support. Although the degree of
influence that groups exert over the Court is uncertain, the continued
presence of heightened group activity, at a minimum, signals that amici
value their own participation. In this sense, the Court’s institutional
legitimacy is reinforced through the symbolic reassurance and discursive
process of amicus participation.
VI. THE EXAMPLES OF WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG
AND ROPER V. SIMMONS
Amicus participation plays a symbolic role and the Court operates
most like a quasi-representative body in cases involving contentious social
and political issues such as abortion, free speech, affirmative action, and
physician-assisted suicide. The types of issues involved in a case may
influence the Court’s receptiveness to amici.191 For instance, topics such
as physician-assisted suicide and capital punishment have broad social
consequences that stretch across individual, organizational, jurisdictional,
and moral boundaries.192 Under such circumstances, Justices cannot
confine themselves to the immediate parties or disputeotherwise they
risk damaging the Court’s institutional legitimacy. In other contexts,
187
The cost of filing an amicus brief can range between $15,000 and $60,000. See Caldeira &
Wright, supra note 13, at 800; see also Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests, supra note 19, at 1112.
Hence, the cost is not trivial.
188
See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 794, 798.
189
See id. at 804. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that the Justices would prefer that
parties file coalition briefs when possible to limit the burden on the court. See Mauro, supra note 56
(quoting Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concerning participation by amici).
190
See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 798–99.
191
There is anecdotal evidence that the Court values external input in certain cases as opposed to
others. See Lynch, supra note 13, at 41–42 (“The majority of clerks (56%) explained that amicus briefs
were most helpful in cases involving highly technical and specialized areas of law, as well as complex
statutory and regulatory cases.”). Amici may be more influential in cases addressing technical and
scientific issues beyond the Court’s expertise. See Stephanie Tai, Friendly Science: Medical, Scientific,
and Technical Amici Before the Supreme Court, 78 WASH. U.L.Q. 789, 794–97 (2000) (“The unique
perspectives, facts, and arguments of scientific disciplines can inform that Court of the broader legal
and policy implications of its rulings.”); see also Mauro, supra note 56. However, this is difficult to
empirically validate. Nonetheless, interest groups seize the opportunity to influence or sway outcomes.
192
Although cases involving business and market regulation do not attract nearly the same level
of public attention as abortion or affirmative action, they are undoubtedly just as vital. See Ronald A.
Cass & Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court’s Business, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2005, at A14. The
effect of poor decisions in these cases could have a crippling economic impact on American businesses
and markets.
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where the issues lack political salience and amicus participation is
minimal, the risk is attenuated.
The level of amicus participation, the diversity of amici, and the actual
content of the arguments raised by the amici in Washington v. Glucksberg
(an assisted suicide case) and Roper v. Simmons (a death penalty case) are
instructive for the overall discussion of political symbolism and the
Supreme Court’s quasi-representative function.
Ultimately, these
examples illustrate that the Court “encourages the aggregation and
articulation of interests” and shares some similarities with other
representative institutions.193 Yet, the Court’s representative function is
more symbolic. This, however, does not present a problem. In fact, this
may be a source of comfort because the Court’s institutional legitimacy is
also tied to its stability and independence. The Court’s representative
capacity must be balanced with its independence. Ultimately, the Court’s
judgment rests with nine Justices who are not threatened with removal.
In addition to robust participation by diverse amici, the content of the
arguments raised by amici illustrates how amicus participation provides a
deliberative and discursive forum.194 The perspectives of amici may
enhance the prospect of better substantive decisions and the mere
opportunity to participate in the lawmaking process enhances the Court’s
legitimacy even where a party disagrees with the ultimate outcome.195
Discursive debate and participation is particularly important for groups
normally excluded from the legislative process. In general, amici in
Glucksberg and Roper made one or a combination of six types of
argumentation: (i) legal arguments; (ii) ethical arguments raising moral and
ethical concerns in support of a particular decision; (iii) emotive arguments
using graphic imagery and language intended to evoke an emotional
response; (iv) externality arguments intended to inform the Court about the
consequences of a decision beyond the immediate context and its effect on
third parties; (v) signaling arguments showing the Court the size, prestige,
and expertise of the amici; and (vi) policy arguments employing empirical
evidence, policy analysis, and social science evidence. The following
subsections provide examples of the diverse amici and the content of the
arguments they pursued in Glucksberg and Roper.
A. Washington v. Gluckberg
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a state statute criminalizing assisted suicide violated
the Due Process Clause insofar as it prohibited physicians from
administering lethal doses of medication to competent terminally ill
193

Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 803. As previously mentioned, the exact degree of
influence remains uncertain.
194
See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 68, at 42.
195
Id.
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196

patients upon their request.
The Court held in favor of the State of
Washington (the petitioner), concluding that (i) the asserted right to
assistance in committing suicide was not a fundamental right protected by
the Due Process Clause and (ii) Washington’s ban on physician-assisted
suicide was rationally related to legitimate government interests.197 In
total, there were over fifty amicus briefs submitted at the merits stage.
These briefs represented a diverse range of parties from the Solicitor
General to women’s rights groups to an individual John Doe afflicted with
a terminal illness. These briefs were submitted in support of petitioner
(i.e., the State of Washington), in support of respondents (i.e., terminally ill
patients, physicians, and nonprofits), and for the purpose of neutral
advocacy. Although there was a considerable degree of repetitive
argumentation among the different amici who supported the same party,
the amici differed in their reasons for support and in the types of
argumentation they pursued.
1. Amici Supporting Petitioners
a. Governmental Amici
In Washington v. Glucksberg, approximately two-thirds of the amicus
briefs at the merits stage were in support of petitioners. This support came
from a significant number of governmental entities. For example, the
Solicitor General asserted that the physician-assisted suicide issue is of
governmental interest because the “United States owns and operates
numerous health care facilities which permit patients to refuse lifesustaining treatment, but do not permit physicians to assist patients in
committing suicide by providing lethal dosages of medication.”198 The
Solicitor General argued that although there was a liberty interest (though
not fundamental) at stake, “[o]verriding state interests justify the State’s
decision to ban physicians from prescribing lethal medication.”199
Moreover, the Solicitor General noted that state legislatures “undoubtedly
have the authority” to create exceptions to a ban on assisted suicide, “[b]ut
196
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–06 (1997). The suit originated in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington where four physicians, three terminally ill
patients, and a nonprofit organization challenged the statute and prevailed at summary judgment. See
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1455–56 (W.D. Wash. 1994). Subsequently,
the State of Washington appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit where the decision
was reversed. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1995). On
rehearing the case en banc, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision. Thereafter, the State
of Washington petitioned for writ of certiorari. The Second Circuit case, Quill v. Vaco, 80 F.3d 716
(2d Cir. 1996), was merged with Washington v. Glucksberg at the Supreme Court. Ultimately, the
Court’s decision was unanimous.
197
See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
198
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 663185. The brief also noted that the
Department of Veteran affairs operated “173 medical centers, 126 nursing homes, and 55 in-patient
hospices.” Id. at 2.
199
Id. at 8–9.
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there is no constitutional basis for imposing that exception on all States.”200
The Solicitor General was not the only party from the federal government
to submit an amicus brief in this case. Senator Orrin Hatch, Representative
Henry Hyde, and Representative Charles Canady submitted a brief arguing
for a restraint on judicial review and cautioned against the Court usurping
the judgments of state legislatures and courts.201
Not surprisingly, many states with similar statutes at risk of being
invalidated submitted briefs. Instead of submitting separate briefs, many
states submitted coalition briefs. In general, state amici asserted legal
arguments that placed extreme emphasis on federalism concerns and
“[r]espect for state sovereignty and the power of the people to directly
govern their own affairs, unless excluded by the Constitution or valid act
of Congress.”202 The states also noted that a majority of states (forty-seven
out of fifty) make the distinction between refusing unwanted life sustaining
treatment and the act of suicide in their natural death/living will statutes.203
Here, the states’ coalition brief signaled to the Court the presence of a
majority consensus.
The State of Oregon submitted a separate individual brief.204 Although
Oregon had altered its laws to permit physician-assisted suicide for the
terminally ill, it supported petitioners nonetheless. Oregon asserted that
the minority of states that permit physician-assisted suicide (or those that
are considering it) also have an interest in the outcome of the case because
if terminally ill adults have a fundamental liberty interest in physicianassisted suicide, “state supervision and regulation in this area will be
subject to exacting judicial review.”205
Although a decision for
respondents would not invalidate Oregon’s assisted suicide law, it would
undermine state legislative discretion overall. Oregon’s brief contended
that the approaches of both Washington and Oregon were constitutionally
200

Id. at 9–10.
See Brief of Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairmen of Senate Judiciary Committee et. al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110),
1996 WL 657755 (“The purpose of this brief is to show that a principled middle ground exists, in
which the courts may recognize and enforce constitutional rights in a fashion that gives due respect to
the coordinate branches of government and the traditions of the people.”).
202
Brief of Amici Curiae States of California, Alabama, Colorado et. al. in Support of Petitioners
State of Washington at 1–3, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
33413986. The states explained:
Whether that balance should be abandoned and the line redrawn to permit an
individual to commit suicide without state interference, and then redrawn yet again
to permit assisted suicide, is a matter appropriately left for the people to decide,
through their duly elected representatives or by initiative ballot. The principles of
federalism embodied in our Constitution require no less.
Id. at 19.
203
See id. (“[S]tatutes in a majority of states . . . codify an individual’s right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment and, in the same legislation, reject any affirmative act to end life.”).
204
Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Oregon in Support of Petitioners State of Washington et al.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 663194.
205
Id. at 1–3.
201
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permissible. Although the states’ briefs articulated similar arguments,
Oregon’s brief, coming from a minority jurisdiction’s perspective,
performed a complementary function.
Another interesting government brief came from prosecuting attorneys
in Oakland County, Michigan where the famous Jack Kevorkian had
performed more than forty-five physician-assisted suicides.206 The
prosecutors acknowledged that “[b]oth petitioners and amici can inform
the Court of the certainty that recognition of a new constitutional right will
inevitably start our society on a trip down [a] ‘slippery slope’ . . . .”207 The
prosecutors wanted to avoid the submission of a “me-too” brief, and
accordingly the prosecutors described themselves as the only amicus who
could inform the Court about “actual practical experience with the reality
of assisted suicide” having attempted to prosecute Jack Kevorkian, the
“‘poster child’ of the assisted suicide movement.”208 The prosecutors
cautioned that physician-assisted suicide was incapable of being confined
or controlled by specific regulations and that “[o]nly by refusing to
recognize a new constitutional right to die can this Court hope to prevent
the incursion of more ‘Dr. Deaths’ who will offer the sick, infirm,
depressed, and aged only the siren song of a painless death.”209 This brief
utilized signaling, emotive, and policy arguments.
b. Non-Governmental Amici
i. Religious Organizations
Petitioners also received significant support from non-governmental
entities. The United States Catholic Conference210 along with many other
religious organizations submitted a coalition brief that included less
argument of religious ethics than repetition of the legal arguments made by
other amici. Besides repetition, this brief also signaled the breadth and
diversity of religious organizations supporting petitioner’s arguments.
ii. Medical Health Organizations
Certain members of the health community supported petitioners’
position. The AMA’s amicus brief took an ethical approach arguing that
“[t]he power to assist in intentionally taking the life of a patient is
antithetical to the central mission of healing that guides both medicine and
206
See Brief of for Richard Thompson, Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
656291.
207
Id. at 4.
208
Id. at 4–5.
209
Id. at 7.
210
Brief for the United States Catholic Conference et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 650919. The Conference’s
members are active Roman Catholic Bishops in the United States. Id. at 2. The statement of interest
also asserts that “Roman Catholicism is the largest religious denomination in the United States, with
over 60 million members in this country.” Id.
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nursing.”
Other professional health groups signed on to the brief as
well. Moreover, the brief cautioned that declaring a fundamental right to
physician-assisted suicide may slow efforts to improve the provision of
pain relief and “compassionate end-of-life care.”212 The AMA’s brief did
not simply repeat legal arguments. Instead, the brief made use of ethical,
signaling, and externality arguments in an effort to broaden the Court’s
perspective on the issue.
iii. Conservative Right to Life Groups
A number of briefs supporting petitioner came from conservative right
to life groups who anticipated the impact this case would have in the
abortion and other legal contexts. At the appellate level, the right to life
agenda had suffered a setback when the court relied heavily on the broad
construction of liberty defined in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.213
Consequently, these groups attempted to shift the balance, using this case
as their platform. The Family Research Council submitted a brief that
focused exclusively on the history of abuse surrounding euthanasia.214 The
brief cited the Holocaust as history’s most tragic and relevant experience
with physician-assisted suicide en route to supporting a blanket ban on
physician-assisted suicide.215 The brief made no mention of the abortion
issue, but instead attempted to quietly affect other contexts through
emotive appeals. Other right to life organizations took a more direct
approach. For instance, the American Center for Law and Justice216 and
the New Hope Life Center, argued against adopting Casey’s “existentialist
notion of liberty” that would lead “to claims of [the] right to use drugs, and
to engage in polygamy, fornication, adultery, divorce, sodomy, bestiality,
and consensual sadism.”217 Similarly, the Rutherford Institute218 and the
National Right to Life Committee219 submitted briefs arguing against the
211
Brief for the American Medical Association et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1,
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656263.
212
Id. at 18.
213
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life.”).
214
See Brief for Family Research Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1,
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656275. The Family Research Council’s mission is
the “preservation and defense of traditional values and the family.” Id.
215
Id. at 2–4.
216
The American Center for Law and Justice is “devoted to safeguarding the sanctity of human
life through education, litigation, legislative assistance, and related activities . . . .” Brief for the
American Center for Law & Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656340.
217
Id. at 3–4.
218
See generally Brief for the Rutherford Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 752715.
219
See Brief for the National Right to Life Committee, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656315 (offering numerous rationales
grounded in precedent and policy in support of the right to life position).
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constitutionality of assisted suicide using different legal arguments.
Beyond the pretextual issue of assisted suicide, right to life groups sought
to plant language and arguments that would bolster right to life advocates’
position in the abortion context.
2. Amici Supporting Respondents
No governmental entities submitted briefs in favor of respondents;
however, respondent support came from a number of sources.
a. Brief on Behalf of an Individual
A California resident afflicted with the late stages of the AIDS virus
submitted a supporting brief.220 The amicus, John Doe, had obtained a
judgment in the District Court for the Central District of California that
found a similar statute criminalizing assisted suicide invalid.221 Within
John Doe’s statement of interest, he described in vivid detail the symptoms
and effects of his illness asserting that AIDS patients are “emaciated
beyond belief, reminiscent of starving individuals in Ethiopia or the dead
photographed concentration camp victims from World War II.”222 John
Doe argued that a statute imposing an absolute prohibition on physicianassisted suicide intruded into the realm of private decision making
“protected by the guarantee of liberty.”223 This brief provides yet another
example of emotive and legal argumentation.
b. Legal Organizations
The ACLU, joining many other organizations, submitted a brief in
support of respondents.224 Unlike other amici, the ACLU’s basic
organizational function is to litigate. The ACLU lacks a discretely defined
constituency, but has, according to its statement of interest, over “300,000
members” nationwide.225 In general, the ACLU’s brief used legal
argumentation. The thrust of the ACLU’s argument (as with other amici
supporting respondents) was that a state’s categorical ban on physicianassisted suicide as applied to competent terminally ill patients was
unconstitutional.226

220
See Brief for John Doe as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(No. 96-110), 1996 WL 743345.
221
Id. at 1–2.
222
Id. at 3–4.
223
Id. at 20.
224
Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 711194.
225
Id. at app. 1a.
226
See id. at 1–2 (“[A] state denies equal protection of its laws when it provides that one class of
persons may exercise th[e] [right to die] while others who are similarly situated for all relevant
purposes are wholly denied the opportunity to exercise the same right for the same reason.”).
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c. Reproductive Rights and Women’s Groups
Reproductive and women’s rights groups supported respondents
because they identified parallels between physician-assisted suicide and
abortion legislation.
The appellate court decision supported the
reproductive and women’s rights agenda because the decision relied
heavily on a broad construction of liberty asserted in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, an abortion case. The National Women’s Health Network and
the Northwest Women’s Law Center together submitted a brief in support
of respondents227 that argued “[i]f the States’ position were accepted, an
individual’s ability to make certain highly intimate and personal choices—
whether those choices are about procreation, abortion, or death—could be
denied through a blanket ban . . . .”228 The Center for Reproductive Law
and Policy urged the Court not to consider its abortion precedents in the
instant case because the “history of discrimination against women, justify a
different standard of review . . . .”229 The amici apparently feared that the
close link between the right to an abortion and a right to physician-assisted
suicide would potentially weaken the pro-choice position.230 Therefore,
the amici supported respondents. Reproductive and women’s rights groups
attempted to instruct the Court about externalities beyond the physicianassisted suicide context.
These groups were also partaking in
counteractive lobbying to offset the efforts of the right to life amici.
d. Gay Rights and AIDS Advocacy Organizations
Constituencies that perceived themselves as disproportionately
affected by the Court’s decision, such as gay rights and AIDS advocacy
organizations, also supported respondents.231 In a brief submitted by the
Gay Men’s Health Crisis and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
the amici argued that the right to end one’s life was a fundamental liberty
interest.232 The brief contained statements from prominent individuals with
disabilities and terminal illnesses and also marshaled the argument that
denial of the right to assistance in dying denies people with terminal
illnesses equal protection under the law.233 Besides making legal
227
Brief for the National Women’s Health Network and Northwest Women’s Law Center as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709341.
228
Id. at 22.
229
Brief for the Center for Reproductive Law & Policy as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 1–7, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708943.
230
See id. at 1 (“The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy . . . protects the right and ability of
women around the world to obtain the full range of reproductive health services including abortion,
contraception and new reproductive technologies.”).
231
There is also the prospect that these groups are seeking broad liberty interests in the instant
case to impact other contexts.
232
See Brief for Gay Men’s Health Crisis and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12–13, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
711205.
233
See id. at 24 app. (including statements of attorney Evan A. Davis and writer and historian
Hugh Gregory Gallagher, both of whom became disabled at a young age).
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arguments, the amici made emotive and signaling arguments to the Court.
e. Mental Health Professionals
A coalition brief of mental health professionals asserted that “[a]s
mental health professionals, we have no interest in ‘promoting’ assisted
suicide.
Our interest lies, instead, in the promotion of patient
autonomy . . . and in the sound development of the law to that end.”234
Despite an espoused ambivalence about physician-assisted suicide, the
amici concluded that the Supreme Court should uphold the lower court
decision on patient autonomy grounds. Similarly, a national medical
student organization and a group of distinguished medical professionals
argued that physician-assisted suicide should be an available option to
competent terminally ill patients.235 In contrast to the AMA brief that
focused on a physician’s ethical obligation to their patient, amici for
respondents focused on patient autonomy arguing that “[t]he principle of
patient autonomy is equally central to medical ethics and to defining the
physician’s role in end-of-life decisions.”236 These briefs in favor of
respondents along with the briefs supporting petitioner signaled to the
Court the split in the medical community and the health profession.
3. Neutral Amici
Not all amici support a particular party; neutral advocacy is also an
option. In Glucksberg, Choice in Dying, Inc.237 took no legal position, but
instead sought “to establish an empirically based framework by which
these important issues may be considered . . . .”238 Although the
organization’s name suggests otherwise, Choice in Dying presented
themselves to the Court as a neutral amicus participating to clarify
misconceptions surrounding physician-assisted suicide.
The brief’s
presentation was neutral in that it cited statistics and observations that
could be used by respondents, petitioners, but most importantly by the
Court in reviewing the appellate court’s decision.
4. The Glucksberg Court’s Use of Amicus Briefs
The majority opinion in Glucksberg cited the United States’ amicus
brief and the states’ coalition brief in its discussion of implicated state
interests.239 Also, the opinion cited several briefs in a footnote to express
234
Brief for Washington State Psychological Association et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 29, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708960.
235
Brief for the American Medical Student Association and a Coalition of Distinguished Medical
Professionals as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1–4, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110),
1996 WL 709332.
236
Id. at 13.
237
Brief for Choice in Dying, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110),
1996 WL 656277.
238
Id. at 1.
239
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728–31.
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the Court’s recognition of the skepticism surrounding physician-assisted
suicide and the potential slippery slope that will follow once a categorical
ban is lifted.240 Although the references to amicus briefs are minimal in the
opinion, this is not the best way to gauge their importance. Supreme Court
Justices may draw from multiple types of information that come to the
Court’s attention via amici.
B. Roper v. Simmons
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether it was permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution to execute a juvenile offender who was under the age of
eighteen when he committed a capital crime.241 The Supreme Court held
(5–4) in favor of respondent, Christopher Simmons, concluding that the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty
on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were
committed. In total, there were eighteen amicus briefs submitted at the
merits stage. These briefs were submitted in support of petitioner (i.e.,
Donald P. Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center), and
respondent (i.e., Christopher Simmons). The overwhelming majority of
briefs (sixteen, in fact) were in support of respondent. The briefs came
from a diverse range of parties including professional associations,
international organizations and leaders, religious organizations, child
advocacy groups, legal organizations and governmental amici. The
Simmons amici opted for coalition briefs, which explains some of the
difference in the number of briefs compared to Washington v. Glucksberg.
1. Amici Supporting Petitioners
Only two amici supported petitioners and sought to reverse the
decision made by the Missouri Supreme Court ruling the execution of
juveniles under the age of eighteen unconstitutional. These amici fell into
two categories: governmental amici and legal organizations.
a. Governmental Amici
The states of Alabama, Delaware, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and
Virginia submitted a brief arguing against a bright line rule forbidding
executions for offenders under the age of eighteen.242 The amici asserted
240

Id. at 732 n.23.
Christopher Simmons, at age seventeen, committed a brutal murder. Simmons v. Roper, 112
S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003). Following a jury trial, Simmons was convicted and sentenced to death.
Id. Simmons, while on death row, filed a new petition for post conviction relief, arguing that the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002), established that the
Constitution prohibits the execution of a juvenile who was under the age of eighteen when the crime
was committed. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed and set aside Simmons’ death sentence. Id.
at 413. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Roper v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004).
242
Brief for the States of Alabama, Delaware, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Virginia as Amici
241
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that, based upon their experience, there is no basis to categorically exempt
juveniles below the age of eighteen from execution. Specifically, amici
argued that there is a distinction between juveniles at ages sixteen and
seventeen compared to the mentally retarded. Thus, a sixteen- or
seventeen-year-old’s culpability should be an individualized determination.
To demonstrate this, amici provided brutal descriptions of crimes
committed by juveniles at the age of sixteen and seventeen to illustrate that
certain juvenile offenders demonstrate culpability.243 Here amici relied on
legal, signaling, and emotive arguments to persuade the Court to overturn
the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision.
b. Legal Organizations
The other amici supporting petitioner, Justice for All Alliance, made
similar arguments against a bright line prohibition and asked for
individualized determinations of culpability for juveniles below the age of
eighteen.244 Whereas legal organizations played a minor role as amici
supporting petitioner, they played a much greater role as amici supporting
respondents.
2. Amici Supporting Respondent
a. Governmental Amici
As a general matter, governmental amici made significant use of legal
and signaling arguments. A coalition brief of states argued that there is a
legislative consensus (i.e., thirty-one states plus the Federal Government
Bar) against imposing the death penalty against juvenile defenders under
the age of eighteen.245 Governmental amici also identified trends toward
stricter juvenile justice laws that expose juveniles to adult criminal
sanctions, yet still draw a distinction with respect to capital punishment.246

Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL
865268 [hereinafter Alabama et al. Brief].
243
See id. at 4–14 (providing case studies demonstrating this phenomenon).
244
See Brief for Justice for All Alliance as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Roper, 543
U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 865269 [hereinafter Justice for All Brief] (“[T]he Court [can]not
group juveniles together as a class but rather [must] acknowledge that they are all different with respect
to their experience, maturity, intelligence, and moral culpability.”). The Justice for All Alliance is a
victim support organization advocating for change in the criminal justice system to ensure that victim’s
rights are considered. Id. at n.2.
245
See Brief for New York, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon, and West
Virginia as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2 n.1, 3, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004
WL 1636449 (“This legislative consensus . . . do[es] not permit the death penalty under any
circumstances.”).
246
See id. at 18 (“[N]umerous states have drastically toughened their treatment of juvenile
offenders by lowering the age at which these offenders may be tried and sentenced as adults. At the
same time, however, there has been a trend in many of these states toward explicitly prohibiting
execution of these offenders.”).
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b. Non-Governmental Amici
i. International Organizations
International organizations and actors expressed a keen interest in the
juvenile capital punishment issue. A coalition brief from the European
Union and other members of the international community signaled the
international consensus against the execution of juvenile offenders.247 A
group of esteemed Nobel Peace Prize Recipients, including former U.S.
President James Earl Carter, asked the Court to consider the opinion of the
international community in deciding the question of whether the death
penalty for juveniles under the age of eighteen was constitutional.248 The
brief asserted that a bar of the juvenile death penalty has jus cogens status
in international law and referenced a number of international treaties and
instruments barring the death penalty for juveniles.249 The brief also
signaled international consensus on the juvenile death penalty and
portrayed the United States as an anomaly in the international
community.250 The amici cited U.S. Supreme Court precedent for
considering international norms when reaching a decision.251 In addition,
the Nobel Prize winners made use of externality arguments, asserting that
the United States’ sanctioning of juvenile executions would undermine the
leverage the United States government would have to influence other
countries to improve their own human rights record.252
Similarly, a brief from Former U.S. Diplomats argued that continuing
the administration of the death penalty against juveniles could negatively
impact the United States government’s standing in the international
community.253 This brief highlighted the condemnation the United States
has received from international bodies like the United Nations concerning
the execution of juvenile offenders.254 The brief also articulated the
diplomatic isolation the United States could face given the consensus in the
world community, even among nations with poor human rights records, on
247

See Brief for European Union, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1–3, Roper,
543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) [hereinafter EU Brief]. Admittedly, the EU and other European countries
mentioned herein are indeed governmental entities. For simplification purposes, this Article classifies
these entities as non-governmental because they are non-domestic.
248
See Brief for President James Earl Carter, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
1–3, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Carter Brief].
249
Id. at 6–7, 19.
250
Id. at 9–10.
251
Id. at 20.
252
Id. at 27–29.
253
See Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1,
Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Diplomats Brief] (“The continuation of this practice by
a few states in the United States strains diplomatic relations with close American allies, increases
America’s diplomatic isolation, and impairs important U.S. foreign policy interests at a critical
time . . . .”). The named diplomats also filed an amicus brief in Atkins v. Virginia. 536 U.S. 304
(2002) (holding that execution of persons with mental retardation violates the Eighth Amendment).
254
Id. at 8–13.
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255

the prohibition of juvenile executions. Another brief from a coalition of
human rights organizations highlighted the historical influence of
international law and the United Kingdom on the formation of the United
States Constitution, particularly the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and
unusual punishment clause.256 This brief made several legal arguments as
to why the Supreme Court should consider international law and norms
(i.e., embrace comparativism) when considering evolving standards of
decency under the Eighth Amendment.
ii. Professional Organizations
Professional organizations, particularly medical and psychological
organizations, relied heavily on empirical data, social science, and
research-based arguments. The AMA and other organizations filed a
coalition brief that provided scientific evidence showing the cognitive and
physiological differences between adolescents and adults and how these
differences support not extending the death penalty to juveniles.257
Similarly, another coalition brief, filed in part by the American
Psychological Association, cited research findings on adolescent
psychological development and thought processes that, in the amici’s view,
undermined the rationale for extending the death penalty to juveniles.258
The brief also cited research that sentencing proceedings did not
adequately account for the mitigating factor of adolescence.259
iii. Religious Organizations
Religious organizations also participated as amici, citing their unique
qualifications for addressing moral and ethical issues. The Conference of
Catholic Bishops and Other Religious Organizations filed a coalition brief
asserting the relevance of religious communities’ views (e.g., Jewish,
Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, etc.) on the imposition of the death penalty
and evolving standards of decency.260 This coalition brief signaled to the
255
See id. at 14–25 (“If these trends continue, the United States will soon stand alone as the only
country in the world that endorses the regular execution of juvenile offenders as part of its ordinary
criminal justice system.”).
256
Brief for the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 2–3, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Roper, England and
Wales] (“[A]mici consider the history of treatment of juveniles in the United Kingdom, as well as the
status of the internal law and practice with respect to the juvenile death penalty, to be of particular
interest to this Court.”).
257
See Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
4–16, 21, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (“These behavioral differences are pervasive and
scientifically documented.”).
258
See Brief for American Psychological Association, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 2–3, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (“The unformed nature of adolescent character
makes execution of 16- and 17-year-olds fall short of the purposes this Court has articulated for capital
punishment.”).
259
Id. at 16–30.
260
Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and other Religious Organizations as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1–2, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633). Another Catholic
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Court the consistent view from various religious faiths on the issue of
juvenile execution, despite differing views on crime and punishment.
iv. Legal Organizations
Legal organizations supporting the respondent had an active presence
as amici. The ABA made legal arguments against extending the death
penalty to juveniles as well as acknowledging the growing national and
international consensus.261 The ABA took no position with respect to the
death penalty as a general matter. However, the ABA noted its opposition
to extending capital punishment to juvenile offenders.262 In a coalition
brief filed by the NAACP LDF and other legal organizations, amici
highlighted the racial disparities connected with the imposition of the death
penalty to juveniles.263 For example, the brief cited statistics indicating
that over fifty percent of juveniles executed since 1973 were either black or
Latino.264 The National Legal Aid and Defender Association made legal
arguments throughout its brief, concluding with the use of emotive
persuasion.265 The conclusion quoted a letter from a former juvenile
offender, who, during the 1980s was sentenced to death, but later resentenced to life in prison.266 This type of emotive argumentation is
perhaps best suited for amici rather than the immediate parties. If similar
arguments are made by the immediate parties, they could potentially
stigmatize a party.267 Although a number of briefs in the legal organization
category were prone to repetition,268 several briefs raised ancillary legal
issues such as procedural deficiencies to sway the Court. For example, the
Coalition for Juvenile Justice Brief argued that juveniles are “less able to
assist counsel, more prone to making false confessions, and more likely to
be wrongfully convicted or wrongfully sentenced to death.”269 Robust
amicus participation by legal organizations in support of respondent
organization, the United States Catholic Conference filed a brief in Washington v. Glucksberg. See
Brief for the United States Catholic Conference et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 650919.
261
See Brief for American Bar Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2–5, 16,
20–21, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (“[T]he United States is virtually alone among the world’s
nations in permitting the execution of juvenile offenders, a factor this Court [has] considered in [the
past].” (internal citations omitted)).
262
Id. at 3.
263
Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 3–5, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633).
264
Id. at 10.
265
See Brief for National Legal Aid and Defender Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 27–29, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (“Amid the legal arguments and counter
arguments made in cases such as th[ese], it is easy to lose track of the truth[,] that these cases affect real
lives.”).
266
Id. at 28–30.
267
See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.b.
268
See, e.g., Brief for Constitution Project as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Roper, 543
U.S. 551 (No. 03-633).
269
Brief for Coalition for Juvenile Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Roper,
543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633).
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reinforces the claim that amici act as a surrogate for vulnerable groups.
v. Child Advocacy and Victim’s Rights Groups
Participation by child advocacy and victims groups reflected several
argumentation styles such as legal, signaling, policy and counteractive
lobbying. The coalition brief of the Juvenile Law Center, included over
fifty entities who advocate on behalf of juveniles and children.270 Here, the
amici made legal and policy arguments, as well as signaling widespread
opposition to the juvenile death penalty.271 A brief from Murder Victims’
Families for Reconciliation asserted an argument rejecting the idea of
using victim’s rights as a basis to justify the death penalty for juveniles.272
Here, the amici engaged in a form of counteractive lobbying by asserting
that victims are not monolithic in their views of capital punishment.273
This brief countered arguments made by another victim’s rights group in
support of petitioner.274
3. The Simmons Court’s use of Amicus Briefs
a. The Majority Opinion’s References to Amici
The majority opinion in Roper v. Simmons had several direct
references to amici. Moreover, information submitted via amici figured
prominently into the Court’s analysis. The Court acknowledged amicisupporting respondents in several areas. The Court first referenced
respondent’s amici in its discussion of the key differences between
juveniles under eighteen and adults, which demonstrate that juvenile
offenders “cannot with reliability be classified among the worst
offenders.”275 Yet, respondent’s amici were most prominent in the Court’s
discussion of international legal and social norms.276 The Court noted that
270
See Brief for Juvenile Law Center et. al as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper, 543
U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1660637.
271
Id. at 19–20.
272
See Brief for Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 3–4, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1588549 (“There is a prevailing
assumption in our society that surviving family members of homicide victims want and need the death
penalty in order to feel that justice has been served. In fact, victims come to this devastating
experience with diverse beliefs, life backgrounds, and needs, and their response to the horror of having
a family member murdered is as varied and diverse as the victims themselves.”).
273
Id. at 3–4.
274
Compare id. at 3–5 (“By invoking victims’ rights in support of the death penalty, [The Justice
for All Alliance] promotes the inaccurate assumption that all victims believe that the execution of
offenders is justice for the crime.”), with Justice For All Brief, supra note 244, at 12 (“[C]ommon sense
dictates that fifteen-year-olds are capable of being deterred from committing first-degree murder if they
know they would receive the ultimate punishment.”).
275
Roper, 543 U.S. at 553.
276
See EU Brief, supra note 247, at 12–13 (relying on amicus study to evaluate international
execution practices); Carter Brief, supra note 248, at 9 (utilizing amicus participation in finding that
“the United States [is] the only nation . . . that has not committed itself by treaty to bar the death
penalty for offenses committed by persons under 18”); Diplomats Brief, supra note 253, at 7 (“Given
the near unanimity of law and practice against executing juvenile offenders worldwide, amici believe
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“[r]espondent and his amici have submitted, and petitioner does not
contest, that only seven countries other than the United States have
executed juvenile offenders since 1990 . . . .”277 The Court also cited the
Brief for Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al.,
when it acknowledged the “opinion of the world community” and the
“overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death
penalty.”278 The Court, however, did not limit it references to respondent’s
amici with whom the majority agreed. The Court also acknowledged and
addressed the arguments raised by state governmental amici for petitioner
against a categorical exclusion for juveniles from the death penalty.279
b. The Dissenting Opinions of Justices O’Connor and Scalia
Perhaps the most interesting discussion involving issues and
information submitted via amici involved the two dissenting opinions of
Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia that discussed the relevance of
international law and expressed some skepticism concerning arguments
presented via amici. Justice O’Connor criticized the majority opinion
asserting:
Because I do not believe that a genuine national
consensus against the juvenile death penalty has yet
developed, and because I do not believe the Court’s moral
proportionality argument justifies a categorical, age-based
constitutional rule, I can assign no such confirmatory role to
the international consensus described by the Court. In short,
the evidence of an international consensus does not alter my
determination that the Eighth Amendment does not, at this
time, forbid capital punishment of 17-year-old murderers in
all cases.280
Justice O’Connor acknowledged the relevance of international law and
norms to the Court’s determination of contemporary standards of decency.
Yet Justice O’Connor expressed the opinion that international law has a
confirmatory role to play that does not trump domestic standards, values,
and consensus as expressed through the actions of the Nation’s
legislatures.
On the other hand, Justice Scalia’s dissent took a more radical
that the current practice by a few states in the United States violates customary international law . . . .”);
Roper, England and Wales, supra note 256, at 13–14 (“Numerous treaties, declarations, and
pronouncements by international bodies, as well as the laws of the vast majority of nations, are
evidence of [this trend].”). The Court specifically cited these briefs. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576.
277
Roper, 543 U.S. at 577.
278
Id. at 578.
279
See id. at 570–74 (“In concluding that neither retribution nor deterrence provides adequate
justification for imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders, we cannot deny or overlook the
brutal crimes too many juvenile offenders have committed.” (internal citation omitted)).
280
Id. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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stance―asserting that international law and opinion had no relevance to
the Court’s inquiry:
The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our
Nation’s moral standards—and in the course of discharging
that awesome responsibility purports to take guidance from
the views of foreign courts and legislatures. Because I do not
believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any
more than the meaning of other provisions of our
Constitution, should be determined by the subjective views of
five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I
dissent.281
Justice Scalia did not limit his criticism to input from international
amici. He challenged the methodology and reliability of scientific studies
particularly those submitted by the American Psychological Association.282
Scalia further added:
Given the nuances of scientific methodology and conflicting
views, courts—which can only consider the limited evidence
on the record before them—are ill equipped to determine
which view of science is the right one. Legislatures “are
better qualified to weigh and ‘evaluate the results of
statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and
with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the
courts.’”283
Justice Scalia did not support a categorical ban because he was not
convinced that there were not individuals under age eighteen who were
able to appreciate the nature of their crimes. To highlight this point, he
ironically cited the amicus brief from the States of Alabama, Delaware,
Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Virginia, which provided examples of
“monstrous acts” of murder committed by individuals under eighteen.284
The majority and dissenting opinions in Roper highlight the tension
between the Court’s role as an independent body and a political actor.
They also reflect the inclusionary function of amicus participation.
C. Political Symbolism as reflected in Glucksberg and Simmons
The in-depth analysis of the amici arguments in Glucksberg and
Simmons provided herein further reveals how amicus participation
281

Id. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 617–18 (“[T]he American Psychological Association (APA), which claims in this case
that scientific evidence shows persons under 18 lack the ability to take moral responsibility for their
decisions, has previously taken precisely the opposite position before this very Court.”).
283
Id. at 618 (internal citations omitted) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
284
Id. at 618–19; see also Alabama et al. Brief, supra note 242, at 9–10 (chronicling one such act
of violence).
282
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resembles a discursive debate and dialogue among multiple
constituencies.285
The Court also participates in these ongoing
discussions―sometimes directly via its published opinions and, at other
times, as a mere listener. The Court’s listening function is particularly
Unsuccessful, but
important and should not be discounted.286
acknowledged, arguments and perspectives from amici, at a minimum,
create the impression that Court decisions are the result of vigorous debate
and reasoning.287 In Glucksberg and Simmons, amicus briefs came from a
wide variety of amici reflecting divergent viewpoints. Without the
inclusion offered by amicus participation, many of the amici and the
interests they represented would have been excluded from the Court’s
consideration despite being impacted by the scope of the Court’s ruling.
Exclusion, in this instance, would engender negative consequences for the
Court’s legitimacy. The presence of an open deliberative forum not only
increases the prospect of more balanced and perhaps better substantive
outcomes, but also enhances the Court’s institutional legitimacy
irrespective of a particular decision or outcome.288 Current Supreme Court
rules favoring broad or “open door” participation implicitly acknowledge
that the Court’s job is not limited to considering the discrete interests of the
immediate parties. The “Supreme Court cannot perceive itself as an
isolated institution handing down rules from its pedestal in Washington,
but instead it should see itself as one actor among many in the midst of a
long-term colloquy.”289 Court decisions like Glucksberg and Simmons,
although creating a degree of finality for the immediate parties, are only
part of an ongoing dialogue between the Court, the public, and their
representatives—and not the final decree.290
Amicus participation
symbolizes the integrated function of the Supreme Court in American
society.291

285

See discussion supra Parts VI.A.–B.
Kenneth S. Abraham, The Costs of Attitudes, 95 YALE L.J. 1043, 1062 (1986) (reviewing
GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A
PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM (1985)) (“[H]onesty is usually the best policy, and that those whose beliefs do
not prevail in a conflict should be made to feel that they remain full and respected members of the
polity.”).
287
CALABRESI, supra note 286, at 90–91 (asserting how some conflicts are best addressed when
legal structures allow for recognition or sympathy of various beliefs).
288
See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 68, at 42.
289
John Moeller, Alexander M. Bickel: Toward a Theory of Politics, 47 J. POL. 113, 133–34
(1985).
290
See id. at 134; see also Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the
Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 575 (2007) (describing courts as catalysts
versus the traditional conception as norm elaborators and enforcers).
291
The amicus brief continues to serve as a “catch-all device for dealing with some of the
difficulties presented by the common law system of adversary proceeding.” Krislov, supra note 13, at
720.
286
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VII. CONCLUSION
This Article does not offer a specific policy or rule revision, but
instead recognizes the benefits of preserving the status quo, i.e., broad
amicus participation before the Supreme Court. Open door access to amici
helps preserve the Court’s institutional legitimacy among varied
stakeholders without significantly undermining the Court’s independence.
Amicus participation dispels external criticism that the Court is detached
and indifferent to the public. In the absence of a restrictive rule governing
amicus participation, the Court has developed its own filtering mechanisms
for analyzing amicus briefs and provided informal guidance to potential
filers concerning the Court’s preferences. Ultimately, criticisms of broad
participation are outweighed by the resulting legitimacy gains. The
Court’s function as a quasi-representative institution is neither without
tension nor imperfection. But, in the end, this function is unavoidable.

